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“[C]ircumstantial evidence is the lifeblood of antitrust law.”
—United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.1
INTRODUCTION
Judges presiding over price-fixing claims recognize that “‘circumstantial
evidence is the lifeblood of antitrust law’ because direct evidence will rarely
be available to prove the existence of a price-fixing conspiracy.”2 Courts of
late, however, have drained this lifeblood by discounting and diminishing
the legal significance of circumstantial evidence in price-fixing litigation.
This is surprising because price-fixing conspiracies illegally overcharge
consumers by billions of dollars every year and are the archetypal
problem that antitrust law seeks to deter and to punish.3 Federal courts
have described collusion among competitors as “a root evil forbidden
by the Sherman Act”4 and have opined that “[n]o antitrust violation is
more abominated than the agreement to fix prices.”5 As such, price
fixing is one of the only antitrust violations that creates both civil and
criminal liability.6 Given the unanimity of opinion that price-fixing

1. 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973).
2. City of Rockford v. Mallinckrodt ARD, Inc., 360 F. Supp. 3d 730, 749 (N.D. Ill.
2019) (quoting United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973)).
3. United States v. Gen. Dyestuff Corp., 57 F. Supp. 642, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
(“The primary evil is the suppression of competition. Price fixing is condemned
because it invariably leads to that evil.”); John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, Does
Crime Pay? Cartel Penalties and Profits, ANTITRUST, Spring 2019, at 29.
4. United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156, 1161 (4th Cir. 1988).
5. Freeman v. San Diego Ass’n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1144 (9th Cir. 2003).
6. Donald I. Baker, The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deter and Punish Cartels and
Bid-Rigging, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 695 (2001) (“Thus, price-fixing, bid-rigging,
and customer and market allocations came to be regarded as criminal, while most
other conduct (for example, joint venture rules, standard setting practices, and vertical
restraints) came to be regarded as only suitable for civil prosecution.”); Salil K.
Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100 MINN. L.
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conspiracies represent the ultimate anticompetitive transgression, one
should expect that federal judges would construct and interpret the
common law of antitrust in a manner that would facilitate holding
price-fixing conspirators accountable. Yet by misconstruing the role of
circumstantial evidence in antitrust litigation, federal courts are
making it exceedingly difficult for private plaintiffs to bring pricefixing claims. This Article explains how.
Antitrust law distinguishes between direct evidence and circumstantial
evidence. Although the actual distinction is often unclear,7 whether a
plaintiff’s evidence is labeled “direct” or “circumstantial” can be
dispositive of price-fixing claims. In most circuits, if the court regards the
plaintiff’s evidence as “direct,” then the case is more likely to make it to
a jury trial.8 If, however, a judge categorizes the plaintiff’s proffer of
proof as “circumstantial” when considering pre-trial motions, the court
will often weigh, dissect, and reject the plaintiff’s evidence and grant
summary judgment to price-fixing defendants.9
This Article reveals an unappreciated way that courts are devaluing
circumstantial evidence in antitrust litigation: in price-fixing cases, judges
routinely reject the plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence as not having
any probative value unless the plaintiff presents separate direct evidence of
a conspiracy. Documenting this phenomenon across federal circuits and
over various forms of circumstantial evidence, this Article shows how
courts have made it unreasonably difficult for plaintiffs to reach a jury
in price-fixing lawsuits based on circumstantial evidence. Price-fixing
REV. 1323, 1357 (2016) (The DOJ “files criminal actions only for clearly intentional
violations of antitrust law, usually for explicit price fixing or bid rigging”).
7. See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661–62 (7th
Cir. 2002) (describing the “distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence” as
“confusing [] and . . . largely if not entirely superfluous”).
8. In re Publ’n Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2012) (“[A]t
least three of our sister circuits have held that summary judgment is generally not
appropriate where a plaintiff has produced direct, as opposed to circumstantial,
evidence of an agreement to fix prices.”) (citing Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris
USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1300 (11th Cir. 2003); Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v.
Darling—Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233 (3d Cir. 1993); In re Coordinated Pretrial
Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 441 (9th Cir. 1990));
see also Am. Chiropractic Ass’n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 226–27 (4th
Cir. 2004).
9. See, e.g., Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow Grp., 490 F. App’x 492, 497 (3d
Cir. 2012) (“Given the relatively lighter burden afforded to a plaintiff putting
forth direct evidence of concerted action, the difference between direct and
circumstantial evidence in an antitrust case assumes heightened significance.”); see
infra Part II.
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claims based on circumstantial evidence are increasingly unlikely to
survive defendants’ motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment,
no matter how persuasive the plaintiff’s case and how plentiful the
plaintiff’s body of circumstantial evidence.
The current state of affairs is troubling because direct evidence of price
fixing is usually unobtainable, as courts uniformly acknowledge.10 Pricefixing cartels take significant measures to conceal their crimes.11
Telephone discussions are conducted over pay phones and untraceable
burner phones.12 While price-fixing conspirators often conduct face-toface meetings, cartel members make “active effort[s] to conceal those
meetings,”13 including using offsite locations.14 For example, the
members of a multi-million dollar synthetic rubber price-fixing conspiracy
held their cartel meetings at random restaurants, coffee shops, and
airport hotels, as well as the Russian Tea Room in New York City and the
Grand Ole Opry in Nashville, Tennessee.15 The multi-billion dollar
international vitamins cartel held covert meetings in Germany’s Black
Forest.16 When not colluding in the wilderness, price fixers register for

10. ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 553–54 (8th Cir. 1991)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (“Indeed, it is axiomatic that the
typical conspiracy is rarely evidenced by explicit agreements, but must almost always
be proved by inferences that may be drawn from the behavior of the alleged
conspirators.”); In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 801 F. Supp. 2d 705, 714 (E.D. Tenn.
2011) (“In conspiracy cases, ‘[t]he element of agreement, . . . is nearly always
established by circumstantial evidence, as conspirators seldom make records of their
illegal agreements.’ United States v. Short, 671 F.2d 178, 182 (6th Cir. 1982).”).
11. Christopher R. Leslie, How to Hide a Price-Fixing Conspiracy, 2021 U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter Leslie, Price-Fixing Conspiracy]; see, e.g., Ohio Valley
Elec. Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 244 F. Supp. 914, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (“The members of
this conspiracy went to great lengths to conceal their activities from those charged with
assuring compliance with the Company’s Directive Policy. The concealment was highly
effective . . . .”).
12. In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Kan. 2012) (explaining
how a conspirator used a “pay phone at a gas station using a prepaid credit card”).
13. E.g., In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F.
Supp. 2d 141, 173 (D. Conn. 2009).
14. GEICO Corp. v. Autoliv, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 799, 836 (E.D. Mich. 2018)
(stating that alleged price fixers met at “‘private residences or remote locations’”); In
re Urethane, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (“Messrs. Fischer and Bernstein conducted
numerous meetings outside of their offices around the time of price increase
announcements.”).
15. EPDM, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
16. Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 714 (2001).
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conference rooms and hotel rooms under false names.17 When conspirators
are nervous that a room has been bugged,18 they will sometimes discuss
pricing outside to avoid listening devices that may be inside.19 Some
price-fixing conspiracies assign code names to firms and individuals
within the cartel,20 while others instead have issued individuals at cartel
meetings “color-coded badges”—instead of traditional nametags—
designed to ensure their anonymity.21
Perhaps the most common way that illegal cartels conceal their pricefixing meetings is to hold them in conjunction with trade association
meetings. Indeed, some cartels, such as the citric acid cartel, create fake
trade associations as a cover for their illegal meetings, including creating
and distributing fake meeting agendas to show government officials or
judges considering summary judgment motions in antitrust litigation.22
This is a more extreme version of the general principle that price fixers
agree to lie when asked about their inter-competitor discussions.23 For
example, conspirators tell falsehoods to make their parallel price
increases look like independent cost-based decisions.24
Price fixers also attempt to obliterate and distort any document trail
that could lead back to them. Price-fixing cartels often adopt strict
rules that forbid notetaking at their meetings and require members to
destroy any incriminating documents that may exist.25 When price

17. See In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig., 795 F. Supp. 2d 647, 663
(E.D. Mich. 2011) (“Defendants traveled to the clandestine meetings separately, so as
to not be seen together, and reserved hotel rooms under false names.”); see also GEICO,
345 F. Supp. 3d at 836; EPDM, 681 F. Supp. 2d at 174.
18. This is not an unreasonable fear. See JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN: THE
DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF ARCHER DANIELS MIDLAND, THE SUPERMARKET TO THE WORLD
224 (2000) (discussing how the FBI installed a camera in a lamp in the hotel suite
where members of the lysine price-fixing cartel were meeting).
19. In re Urethane, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
20. MICHAEL A. UTTON, CARTELS AND ECONOMIC COLLUSION: THE PERSISTENCE OF
CORPORATE CONSPIRACIES 56 (2011) (discussing graphite electrodes cartel).
21. Bray v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 851, 857 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
22. James M. Griffin, An Inside Look at a Cartel at Work: Common Characteristics of
International Cartels, in CARTELS VOLUME I 115, 122 (Margaret C. Levenstein & Stephen
W. Salant eds., 2007).
23. See In re Urethane, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
24. ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARX, THE ECONOMICS OF COLLUSION:
CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGS 38, n.36 (2012) (discussing the cartonboard cartel).
25. Leslie, Price-Fixing Conspiracy, supra note 11; see, e.g., THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE
BOTTLENECKS OF BUSINESS 210 (1940) (“An astonishingly large number of respectable
businessmen will strip their files of incriminating documents.”); JOHN M. CONNOR,

1718

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1713

fixers do share sensitive documents with their co-conspirators, it is with
the understanding that the document will be destroyed as soon as
practicable.26 When they exchange emails, the messages come with
instructions to “destroy e-mail after reading.”27 Should these efforts fail, cartel
members alter written documents to exclude the details of incriminating
discussions.28 They doctor travel documents and expense reports, falsifying
their travel destinations and dining companions in order to conceal their
meetings with rivals.29
Because price fixers generally eliminate direct evidence of their
crime, most plaintiffs making price-fixing claims must rely on
circumstantial evidence. If, however, courts evaluating such claims are
unreceptive to circumstantial evidence, victims of price fixing will go
uncompensated and price-fixing conspirators will be emboldened to
continue and perhaps expand their illegal activities. Unfortunately,
judicial hostility to circumstantial evidence is causing a state of decline
in the effectiveness of antitrust law’s ability to combat collusion. Unless
federal judges recognize and arrest this problematic trend, courts will
invite a new wave of price fixing.
Part I introduces the basics of a price-fixing claim. The plaintiffs’ first
hurdle is to show that competitors agreed to collude. Because direct
evidence of price-fixing conspiracies rarely exists, federal courts have
constructed a legal test for proving a conspiracy through circumstantial
evidence. Plaintiffs generally need to show that the defendants engaged
in parallel conduct and that “plus factors” are present. Plus factors are
evidence suggesting that the defendants’ parallel conduct was the product
of collusion, not of independent decision making. Part I reviews the role
of plus factors in proving price fixing through circumstantial evidence.
Part II explains how courts have misapplied the plus-factor analysis
by disregarding specific plus factors unless plaintiffs have direct
GLOBAL PRICE FIXING: OUR CUSTOMERS ARE THE ENEMY 313 (2001) (“At these meetings,
participants were reminded that paper records were to be destroyed.”).
26. In re Urethane, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (“Mr. Stern gave Mr. Hankins a
document containing pricing information after Mr. Hankins gave assurances that the
document would be destroyed . . . .”).
27. In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litig., 681 F.
Supp. 2d 141, 174 (D. Conn. 2009).
28. In re Urethane, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
29. In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 266 F. Supp. 3d 750, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2017)
(falsifying a lunch companion on an expense report to conceal meeting with a
competitor); In re Urethane, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (“Mr. Dhanis failed to list Messrs.
Wood and Dineen on the expense report for a meal at which he made comments
indicating that he may have been attempting to coordinate pricing . . . .”).
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evidence of a conspiracy. Judges have done this over a range of plus
factors, including the defendants’ opportunity to conspire; their intercompetitor communications, including invitations to collude; their
exchanges of price and sales data; their possession of rivals’ confidential
documents; their price-fixing activities in foreign countries; their artificial
standardization of their products; and their maintenance of stable market
shares. For these plus factors, some courts have essentially required
plaintiffs to present direct evidence of an agreement in order for a
particular plus factor to count as circumstantial evidence from which an
agreement can be inferred. This effectively eliminates the value of
circumstantial evidence—“the lifeblood of antitrust law”—in price-fixing
litigation by crediting it only when direct evidence makes the plaintiff’s
circumstantial evidence unnecessary.30
Other antitrust opinions inappropriately weaken circumstantial
evidence by denying certain plus factors their probative value unless
the plaintiff can prove a causal link between that individual plus factor
and the defendants’ parallel price increases. This type of causation
requirement is deeply flawed because proof of agreement and proof of
causation are entirely separate elements of a price-fixing claim. By
misconceiving the relationship between plus factors and causation,
these decisions essentially impose a direct evidence requirement.
Finally, some courts have chastised antitrust plaintiffs for “assuming”
that a price-fixing conspiracy exists and then proffering plus factors to
support their case. This judicial critique is misguided because it
fundamentally misconstrues how evidence works: the plaintiff presents
her theory of the case and then proffers evidence to support her
theory. If antitrust plaintiffs cannot use this centuries-old process, then
they cannot bring antitrust claims based on circumstantial evidence.
Part III describes the proper role of circumstantial evidence in pricefixing litigation. At root, the dozens of antitrust opinions discussed in
Part II all suffer from the same problem: courts invert the proper
relationship between plus factors and agreement by suggesting that
plaintiffs need to prove the presence of an agreement in order to
establish that a plus factor exists and should be given weight. This is
incorrect because plus factors are used to show that an agreement
exists, not vice versa.
Part IV concludes. It explains the consequences of the misguided
antitrust opinions analyzed in Parts II and III. Through a multitude of
missteps, federal courts have improperly required plaintiffs to present
30. United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 534 n.13 (1973).
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direct evidence of collusion even though the plaintiffs are bringing a
circumstantial case. By effectively requiring direct evidence—often
while acknowledging that direct evidence is generally unavailable to
antitrust plaintiffs—courts are inappropriately shielding price-fixing
conspirators from liability. This undermines deterrence of cartel
activity and denies compensation to victims of cartel overcharges.
I. PROVING AGREEMENTS TO FIX PRICES
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns “[e]very contract, combination
in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade . . . .”31
Federal courts generally use the word “agreement” as a short hand for
the first element of a Section 1 claim and have read the word
“unreasonable” into the statute, so that Section 1 condemns only those
agreements that unreasonably restrain trade.32 Some agreements, such
as horizontal price fixing, are considered unreasonable as a matter of
law and are declared per se illegal.33 Thus, the focus of price-fixing
litigation is generally whether or not the plaintiff can prove the first
element—agreement.
A. Direct Proof
Plaintiffs can prove an agreement among competitors to fix prices with
either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence or a combination of
both. As in other areas of law, direct evidence of conspiracy is stronger
than circumstantial evidence. Courts have defined direct evidence in the
context of antitrust conspiracies as “evidence that is explicit and requires
no inferences to establish the proposition or conclusion being asserted.”34
Because direct evidence entails no inferences to establish the fact of an
agreement, “a court need not be concerned about the reasonableness

31. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
32. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (“[T]his Court has long
recognized that Congress intended to outlaw only unreasonable restraints.”).
33. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 161 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
34. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (citations
omitted); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Direct
evidence in a Section 1 conspiracy must be evidence that is explicit and requires no
inferences to establish the proposition or conclusion being asserted.”); cf. In re Publ’n
Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 64 (2d Cir. 2012) (“All evidence, including direct
evidence, can sometimes require a factfinder to draw inferences to reach a particular
conclusion, though ‘[p]erhaps on average circumstantial evidence requires a longer
chain of inferences.’” (quoting Sylvester v. SOS Children’s Vills. Ill., Inc., 453 F.3d 900,
903 (7th Cir. 2006))).
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of the inferences to be drawn from such evidence.”35 Some federal courts
have defined direct evidence in the context of antitrust conspiracies as
evidence that is “tantamount to an acknowledgment of guilt.”36
Beyond such descriptions of direct evidence, many courts define the
concept of direct evidence by listing examples of it. Direct evidence is
not a monolithic category; direct evidence exists along a continuum of
strong to weak. Admission by a defendant that it conspired to fix prices
with its competitors is, by itself, sufficient proof of an agreement.37 Such

35. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233
(3d Cir. 1993).
36. Hyland v. HomeServices of Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 310, 318 (6th Cir. 2014)
(quoting In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir.
2002)).
37. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup, 295 F.3d at 654 (“Because price fixing is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, an admission by the defendants that they agreed to fix
their prices is all the proof a plaintiff needs.”).
Confessions are most likely to occur in criminal cases against price fixers. The
government can use the threat of imprisonment to encourage price fixers to admit
guilt in exchange for leniency. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 62–63 (2d ed. 2018) (“Direct evidence of a conspiracy is often
present in criminal cases in which there has been a successful amnesty applicant or
plea bargain that supplies testimony from a coconspirator.”). Under the government’s
antitrust amnesty program, the first cartel member to expose the cartel gets automatic
leniency, which means amnesty/freedom from criminal fines and no imprisonment
for any of that firm’s employees. These confessions generally entail an obligation of
the confessing firm and its employees to cooperate with the government’s prosecution
of the non-confessing firms in the cartel. Perhaps because of this leverage, the
government does not generally prosecute price fixing unless it has direct evidence of
collusion. Louis Kaplow, Direct Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, 3
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 449, 517 (2011) (“[C]riminal price-fixing prosecutions (that occur
mainly in the United States), which target individuals for incarceration, seem to
require direct, explicit, even smoking-gun evidence of prohibited communications,
presumably due in significant part to high proof burdens and perhaps also the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.”).
If the government secures a victory against a price-fixing firm—whether
through confession, consent decree, or a verdict at trial—private plaintiffs can use the
government’s case as prima facie evidence of a violation. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (2018).
Most private antitrust lawsuits do not follow on the heels of government litigation.
Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical Assessment of
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1299 (2013) (noting estimates
of between twenty and twenty-five percent of private antitrust cases following DOJ
cases). But, even in follow-on cases, plaintiffs often need to proffer additional evidence
of liability because government prosecutors will allow defendants to plead guilty to
conspiracies that are narrower in time and scope than the conspiracies alleged in
private follow-on lawsuits. See, e.g., In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig.,
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admissions, however, are rare. Many courts describe “[a] document or
conversation explicitly manifesting the existence of the agreement in
question” as “an example of direct evidence.”38 If the plaintiffs possessed,
for instance, a recorded phone call between competitors in which the
defendants agreed to fix prices, that would be direct evidence of an
agreement.39 In the absence of a recording, eyewitness testimony detailing
inter-competitor conversations to collude also constitutes direct evidence
of an agreement.40 Direct evidence of an agreement becomes significantly
stronger when multiple participants testify about price-fixing meetings or
when contemporaneous written notes support an individual’s testimony.41
If the plaintiff presents direct evidence of an agreement, then the
plaintiff does not need circumstantial evidence to survive summary
judgment. The presence of direct evidence of price fixing should fast
track an antitrust case to be heard by a jury because a proffer of direct
evidence generally prevents the dismissal of a Section 1 case and
precludes summary judgment for defendants.42 Because direct evidence
requires no inferences,43 once an antitrust plaintiff proffers direct

541 F. Supp. 2d 487, 492 (D. Conn. 2008); JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 400–
01 (2d ed. 2008).
38. Burtch, 662 F.3d at 226 (quoting In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d
300, 324 n.23 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. Budd Baer, Inc.,
826 F.2d 1335, 1338 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that “a memorandum written by [a] GMC
representative . . . describing [his] meeting with dealers of the Better Buy Buick Association”
was direct evidence of “concert of action among the defendants relevant to the alleged
conspiracy”); In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 634 (5th Cir. 1981).
39. See Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir.
2013) (“Such evidence would consist, for example, of a recorded phone call in which
two competitors agreed to fix prices at a certain level.”); Iowa Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 340 F. Supp. 3d 285, 317–18 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (treating as direct evidence “a recorded Morgan Stanley conference call” in
which defendants “agreed that Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs needed to ‘get a
hold of this thing,’ [meaning] that they needed to act together to” exclude a
competitive threat).
40. See United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625, 636 (5th Cir. 2004).
41. See United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 165 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
42. See In re Ins. Brokerage, 618 F.3d at 323–24 (positing that “[a]llegations of direct
evidence of an agreement, if sufficiently detailed, are independently adequate” under
Twombly).
43. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1233
(3d Cir. 1993).
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evidence of an agreement, the case should proceed to a jury, which
can evaluate the credibility of this evidence.44
Direct evidence is powerful but often not available, particularly for
per se antitrust violations such as price fixing.45 Horizontal price fixing,
after all, violates both civil and criminal law, the latter of which prescribes
imprisonment for up to ten years.46 Criminals are generally reticent to
memorialize their criminal activity in writing.47 Direct evidence generally
is unobtainable because price fixers take great efforts to conceal their
actions,48 including using false names, creating fake trade associations
44. William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 405,
443 (2007) (“The only question about this sort of evidence is its credibility, which the
jury is best situated to evaluate . . . .”).
45. Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 465 (3d Cir. 1998) (“While direct
evidence, the proverbial ‘smoking-gun,’ is generally the most compelling means by
which a plaintiff can make out his or her claim, it is also frequently difficult for antitrust
plaintiffs to come by.”); United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 689 (S.D.N.Y.
2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Because unlawful conspiracies tend to form
in secret, however, proof of a conspiracy will rarely consist of explicit agreements.”).
In many Section 1 cases not involving claims of naked price-fixing, direct evidence
often exists in the form of written contracts and organization by-laws. See, e.g., NCAA
v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 89–91 (1984) (analyzing NCAA’s written by-laws limiting
the number of televised college football games); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4 (1979) (analyzing the legality of written blanket licenses for
copyrighted works); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684
(1978) (analyzing the legality of a trade association’s “Code of Ethics” precluding
engineers from competing on price when bidding for contracts).
46. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2018).
47. Direct evidence of price-fixing can nonetheless exist in the form of audio and
video recordings of cartel meetings or eyewitness accounts of cartel participants who
have turned states’ evidence in exchange for leniency. See, e.g., United States v.
Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 659 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The government established the accuracy
of the recordings through witnesses who attended the meetings . . . .”). Such evidence
is the exception.
48. John E. Lopatka, Economic Expert Evidence: The Understandable and the “Huh?,” 61
ANTITRUST BULL. 434, 439 (2016) (“Indeed, sometimes the only available evidence will
be circumstantial, colluders being clever enough to avoid fixing prices in front of
eyewitnesses and loyal (or frightened) enough to remain mum.”); see, e.g., In re
Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. MISC 99-197 (TFH), 2000 WL 1475705, at *3 (D.D.C.
May 9, 2000) (alleged price fixers’ acts of concealment included holding “secret
meetings, confining the conspiracy plan to a small group of key officials at each
company, avoiding references in documents or the creation of documents which
would reveal these antitrust violations, destroying documents, using codes to conceal
the identity of co-conspirators, and providing false information to law enforcement
authorities”); JOHN G. FULLER, THE GENTLEMAN CONSPIRATORS: THE STORY OF THE PRICEFIXERS IN THE ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY 12–13 (1962) (discussing concealment methods of
electrical equipment cartels).
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as a cover for their cartel meetings, using pay phones, falsifying travel
and business records, and destroying incriminating documents.49 For
these reasons, several courts have acknowledged that “it is axiomatic
that the typical conspiracy is ‘rarely evidenced by explicit agreements,’
but must almost always be proved by ‘inferences that may be drawn
from the behavior of the alleged conspirators.’”50 Thus, as a rule, direct
evidence would be potent but is mostly inaccessible.
B. Circumstantial Evidence
Direct evidence is not required to prove price fixing.51 In the absence
of direct evidence of a horizontal agreement, antitrust plaintiffs can
prove the existence of illegal collusion through circumstantial
evidence.52 The traditional process for proving an anticompetitive
agreement through circumstantial evidence involves two steps: parallel
behavior and plus factors.53 Initially, the plaintiff should show that the
defendants engaged in similar conduct. Courts refer to this as “conscious
parallelism,” which the Supreme Court has defined as “the process, not
in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in effect
share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing,

49. See Leslie, Price-Fixing Conspiracy, supra note 11.
50. ES Dev., Inc. v. RWM Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 547, 553–54 (8th Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted); see Seagood Trading Corp. v. Jerrico, Inc., 924 F.2d 1555, 1573
(11th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is only in rare cases that a plaintiff can establish the existence
of a conspiracy by showing an explicit agreement; most conspiracies are inferred from
the behavior of the alleged conspirators.”).
51. In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[D]irect allegations of conspiracy are not always possible given the
secret nature of conspiracies. Nor are direct allegations necessary.”).
52. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Direct
evidence of conspiracy is not a sine qua non, however. Circumstantial evidence can
establish an antitrust conspiracy.”).
53. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 n.11 (3d Cir. 2004).
I say this is the “traditional process” because, while the two-step approach is the most
common way that plaintiffs present a circumstantial case for price-fixing, a plaintiff
can prove an agreement through circumstantial evidence without proof of parallelism.
See Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 626 (E.D. Mich. 2012)
(“Nonetheless, this Court is aware of no case law—nor have Defendants identified
any—that mandates that a plaintiff’s portfolio of circumstantial evidence in a § 1
case must include proof of parallel conduct.”); Fleischman v. Albany Med. Ctr., 728 F.
Supp. 2d 130, 158 (N.D.N.Y. 2010) (“Parallel pricing is merely ‘one such form of
circumstantial evidence.’ In re Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust
Litig., 681 F. Supp. 2d 141, 166 (D. Conn. 2009). Accordingly, Plaintiffs need not prove
parallel pricing in order to prevail on per-se claim based on circumstantial evidence.”).

2020]

DECLINE AND FALL OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

1725

supracompetitive level by recognizing their shared economic interests
and their interdependence with respect to price and output decisions.”54
This parallel conduct generally involves synchronous price movements,
but can include concurrent changes to other contract terms or business
practices.55
Conscious parallelism is probative of price fixing56 but is insufficient
on its own for a plaintiff to prove that the defendants have colluded.57
This makes sense because even in a perfectly competitive market,
prices can move in unison.58 Parallel pricing, or other conduct, can
occur even when firms are engaging in unilateral decision making.59
54. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993).
55. In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 903 (6th Cir. 2009)
(“Allegations of concerted action by competitors are frequently based on a pattern of
uniform business conduct, which courts often refer to as ‘conscious parallelism.’”); see
also Christopher R. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, 96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018) [hereinafter
Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate] (discussing parallel imposition of anti-consumer mandatory
arbitration clauses).
56. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Thus, when
two or more competitors in such a market act separately but in parallel fashion in their
pricing decisions, this may provide probative evidence of the existence of an
understanding by the competitors to fix prices.”).
57. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir. 2015)
(citations omitted) (“Accordingly, evidence of conscious parallelism cannot alone
create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy. To move the ball across the goal line, a
plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors are present.”); Mitchael v. Intracorp,
Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 859 (10th Cir. 1999) (“While consciously parallel behavior may
contribute to a finding of antitrust conspiracy, it is insufficient, standing alone, to
prove conspiracy.”); Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d
37, 51 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he fact that [the defendants] engaged in parallel pricing
of insulation cannot, by itself, support an inference that the two companies conspired
to fix prices.”); Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1987) (citation
omitted) (“Parallel conduct can be probative evidence bearing on the issue of whether
there is an antitrust conspiracy. However, parallel conduct alone will not suffice as
evidence of such a conspiracy even if the defendants ‘knew the other defendant
companies were doing likewise.’ More must be shown.”).
58. In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1022
(N.D. Cal. 2007) (“We must remember that competitive market forces will tend to
drive the prices of like goods to the same level, so like prices on like products are not,
standing alone, sufficient to implicate price-fixing.”).
59. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Parallel
conduct in itself is insufficient to state a plausible claim because it is ‘consistent with
conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive
business strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.’”
(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007))); see also In re
Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 397 (“The upshot is oligopolists may maintain supracompetitive
prices through rational, interdependent decision-making, as opposed to unlawful
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The First Circuit has explained that “[e]ach producer may
independently decide that it can maximize its profits by matching one
or more other producers’ price, on the hope that the market will be
able to maintain high prices if the producers do not undercut one
another.”60 Further, courts cannot require sellers to ignore their rivals’
pricing altogether.61 Ultimately, allowing juries to infer a price-fixing
agreement solely from parallel price movements could essentially force
sellers to make inefficient pricing decisions simply to avoid the
appearance of parallelism.62
In order to reduce the risk that courts will condemn conduct that is
merely parallel but not collusive, plaintiffs must also present plus
factors.63 Evidence of plus factors augments the evidence of parallelism,
making the latter more probative of price fixing.64 Some antitrust
concerted action, if the oligopolists independently conclude that the industry as a
whole would be better off by raising prices.”); White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571,
577 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Because supracompetitive prices—prices above what they would be
in a perfectly competitive market—can result from both lawful conscious parallelism and
an unlawful agreement to fix prices, antitrust doctrine has developed evidentiary standards
to minimize the risk that legal conduct will be chilled or punished.”).
60. White, 635 F.3d at 576.
61. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1042 (8th Cir.
2000) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (en banc) (“[W]e cannot order sellers to make their
decisions without taking into account the reactions of their competitors.”).
62. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432, 445 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[P]ermitting an inference of conspiracy from the
parallel pricing evidence alone would result in an anticompetitive dislocation by
distorting independent pricing decisions.”).
63. In re Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 398 (citations omitted) (“Accordingly, evidence of
conscious parallelism cannot alone create a reasonable inference of a conspiracy. To
move the ball across the goal line, a plaintiff must also show that certain plus factors
are present.”); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1033 (“A plaintiff has the burden to
present evidence of consciously paralleled pricing supplemented with one or more plus
factors.”); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (citations
omitted) (“Because the evidence of conscious parallelism is circumstantial in nature,
courts are concerned that they do not punish unilateral, independent conduct of
competitors. They therefore require that evidence of a defendant’s parallel pricing be
supplemented with ‘plus factors.’”); Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438,
1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 660 F.2d 1195,
1201 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Parallel behavior without more (a ‘plus factor’) is not enough
to establish a Sherman Act violation.”).
64. Mitchael v. Intracorp, Inc., 179 F.3d 847, 858–59 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Such
parallel behavior may, however, support the existence of an illegal agreement when
augmented by ‘additional evidence from which an understanding among the parties
may be inferred.’”); see also White, 635 F.3d at 577 (“Plaintiffs must establish that it is
plausible that defendants are engaged in more than mere conscious parallelism, by
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opinions have defined plus factors as “economic actions and outcomes
that are largely inconsistent with unilateral conduct but largely
consistent with explicitly coordinated action.”65 Courts, however, have
not coalesced on a uniform definition of plus factors.66 Some courts
have treated plus factors as “proxies for direct evidence of an
agreement.”67 Other courts have noted, that “[t]he simple term ‘plus
factors’ refers to ‘the additional facts or factors required to be proved
as a prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a
conspiracy.’”68 Plus factors can help “establish that the defendants were not
engaging merely in oligopolistic price maintenance or price leadership but
rather in a collusive agreement to fix prices or otherwise restrain trade.”69
The presence of plus factors, “when viewed in conjunction with the
parallel acts, can serve to allow a fact-finder to infer a conspiracy.”70
This combination of conscious parallelism and plus factors forms the
foundation of most price-fixing cases based on circumstantial
evidence.71

pleading and later producing evidence pointing toward conspiracy, sometimes
referred to as ‘plus factors.’”); In re Med. X-Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 946 F. Supp. 209,
218 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Thus, although evidence of parallel conduct between competitors
alone is insufficient to prove an agreement or conspiracy, an agreement may properly be
inferred from conscious parallelism when these ‘plus factors’ are present.”).
65. In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1194 (9th
Cir. 2015).
66. Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 683, 749–50 (2011) (“[T]here is no readily accepted principle that
determines what counts as a sufficient plus factor and what does not (or what
combinations might be jointly sufficient).”).
67. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 360 (3d Cir. 2004).
68. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting
AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW § 1433(e)).
69. Capitol Body Shop, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 163 F. Supp. 3d 1229,
1234 (M.D. Fla. 2016) (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems, Inc., 158 F.3d 548,
570–71 (11th Cir. 1998)); see also In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 122 (stating that plus
factors “show that the allegedly wrongful conduct of the defense was conscious and
not the result of independent business decisions of the competitors”).
70. Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253–54 (2d Cir. 1987).
71. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224,
1232–33 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[I]n a conscious parallelism case, a plaintiff also must
demonstrate the existence of certain ‘plus’ factors, for only when these additional
factors are present does the evidence tend to exclude the possibility that the
defendants acted independently.”); Avenarius v. Eaton Corp., 898 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738
(D. Del. 2012) (“Ultimately, however, plus factors are simply circumstances in which
the inference of independent action is less likely than that of concerted action.”).
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Courts have not created a completely comprehensive list of plus
factors.72 Instead, courts generally discuss the plus factors proffered by
the plaintiffs in the litigation at hand. But because plaintiffs only
present those plus factors that they think are present and relevant to
their lawsuit, the plus factor list in any given antitrust opinion is
“neither exhaustive nor exclusive.”73
The plus-factor approach provides a loosely structured framework
for making a circumstantial case for finding an agreement among
competitors to fix prices. Each plus factor is a piece of circumstantial
evidence. No minimum number of plus factors is required as “the plusfactor inquiry is not intended to be rigid or formulaic.”74 Moreover,
because these are plus factors, not elements, no single plus factor is
dispositive or necessary to a plaintiff’s case.75
Finally, judges and juries must analyze all of the proffered plus
factors collectively and not in isolation from each other.76 Over half a
century ago, the Supreme Court established the rule that plaintiffs in
antitrust cases
should be given the full benefit of their proof without tightly
compartmentalizing the various factual components and wiping the
slate clean after scrutiny of each. The character and effect of a
conspiracy are not to be judged by dismembering it and viewing its
separate parts, but only by looking at it as a whole.77

At the pre-trial stage, if the totality of plus factors, read together,
provides a plausible basis for inferring a price-fixing conspiracy, a
72. In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360.
73. Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 781 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that
the list of plus factors it presented was “neither exhaustive nor exclusive, but rather
illustrative of the type of circumstances which, when combined with parallel behavior,
might permit a jury to infer the existence of an agreement”); see also In re Flat Glass,
385 F.3d at 360 (“The question then becomes, what are ‘plus factors’ that suffice to defeat
summary judgment? There is no finite set of such criteria; no exhaustive list exists.”).
74. Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 207 (3d Cir.
2017) (Stengel, J., dissenting) (citing In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 361 n.12; Petruzzi’s,
998 F.2d at 1242).
75. Id. at 206–07; In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651,
655 (7th Cir. 2002).
76. In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46, 58 (D.D.C.
2016) (“‘Plus factors’ must be evaluated holistically.”); In re Currency Conversion Fee
Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 370–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Plaintiffs’ conspiracy
allegations must be examined holistically.”); see Christopher R. Leslie, The Probative
Synergy of Plus Factors in Price-Fixing Litigation, 115 NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021)
(manuscript at 1–2) (on file with author) [hereinafter Leslie, Probative Synergy].
77. Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962).
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judge should allow the case to proceed to trial, and at trial a reasonable
jury may find the defendants liable based on this circumstantial
evidence.78
Circumstantial evidence sufficient to infer an agreement displaces
any need for direct evidence of an agreement.79 Consequently, to survive
a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, “a nonmovant plaintiff in
a section 1 case does not have to submit direct evidence, i.e., the so-called
smoking gun, but can rely solely on circumstantial evidence and the
reasonable inferences drawn from such evidence.”80 Despite the fact that
all courts have recognized the principle that circumstantial evidence
alone can be sufficient, many judges have misapplied antitrust law in a
manner that effectively requires private plaintiffs to present direct
evidence of price fixing, as Part II shows.
II. THE DE FACTO DIRECT EVIDENCE REQUIREMENT IN PRICE-FIXING
LITIGATION
Judges have misunderstood how to interpret plus factors when assessing
a circumstantial case for inferring an agreement among competitors, as
dozens of recent antitrust opinions show. This Part exposes how judges
routinely miscomprehend the role of plus factors as circumstantial
evidence and effectively require direct evidence of an agreement.
Judges do so in several ways, including depriving plus factors of their
probative value unless the plaintiff has direct evidence of collusion;
78. Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 47 (1st Cir. 2013)
(“While each of [plaintiff’s] allegations of circumstantial [evidence of] agreement
standing alone may not be sufficient to imply agreement, taken together, they provide
a sufficient basis to plausibly contextualize the agreement necessary for pleading a § 1
claim.”); Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 466 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[W]hen
examining the sufficiency of what the plaintiff has adduced, [courts] are not to ‘tightly
compartmentalize the evidence,’ but rather [courts] must evaluate it as a whole to see
if it supports an inference of concerted action.”); Alpha Lyracom Space Commc’ns,
Inc. v. Comsat Corp., 968 F. Supp. 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 372 (2d Cir.
1997) (“The Court . . . does not examine each piece of evidence in a vacuum, but
considers the evidence as a whole to determine the reasonableness of inferences to be
drawn by a jury.”).
79. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven in the absence
of direct ‘smoking gun’ evidence,” a horizontal agreement, such as the one alleged in
the case before us, “may be inferred on the basis of conscious parallelism, when such
interdependent conduct is accompanied by circumstantial evidence and plus factors”).
80. Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1230
(3d Cir. 1993); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Direct evidence of conspiracy is not a sine qua non, however. Circumstantial
evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy.”).
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imposing a causation requirement on individual plus factors; and
condemning the entire plus-factor framework as “backward reasoning.”
These judicial opinions display a fundamental misconception about the
purpose and process of proving collusion through circumstantial evidence.
A. Direct Evidence as a Prerequisite to Crediting Circumstantial Evidence
Across a range of different plus factors, several judicial opinions
share common errors in their approach to evaluating the connection
between plus factors and proof of agreement. Federal courts have
diminished or eliminated the significance of circumstantial evidence
in price-fixing cases by condemning plus-factor evidence that falls
short of direct proof or is not supported by direct evidence of
collusion. In some ways, courts confuse the relationship between
circumstantial evidence and direct evidence. A court traditionally
performs plus-factor analysis after determining that insufficient direct
evidence exists to prove an agreement. If the plaintiffs have direct
evidence of an agreement, then there is no need to rely on circumstantial
evidence. Many antitrust opinions, however, have discounted individual
plus factors unless the plaintiffs also have direct evidence of collusion.
This Section demonstrates how several courts have essentially stripped
several well-established plus factors of their probative value.
1. Opportunity to conspire
Like most illegal conspiracies, price-fixing cartels are generally
preceded by motive and opportunity. The motive for price fixing is
straightforward: rival firms can maximize their collective profits by
colluding instead of competing.81 Opportunity can be trickier. A
gathering of rival firms can appear suspicious to antitrust authorities
and customers. Adam Smith famously asserted that “[p]eople in the
same trade seldom meet together even for merriment or diversion, but
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public and in some
contrivance to raise prices.”82 Although Smith overstated the case,83

81. In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186, 1194–95
(9th Cir. 2015) (“Any firm that believes that it could increase profits by raising prices
has a motive to reach an advance agreement with its competitors.”).
82. United States v. Taubman, 297 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 55 (Great Books ed. 1952) (1776)).
83. See id. at 166 (describing the Adam Smith quotation as “problematic” because
it “suggests that knowledge of and participation in an antitrust conspiracy can be
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competing firms do often find opportunities for collusion in trade
association conferences and other seemingly legitimate get-togethers, as
well as in secret meetings.84 Proving that such opportunities existed
among defendants can be an important part of a plaintiff’s circumstantial
case.85
Although courts recognize that the opportunity to conspire is a plus
factor,86 in discussing the role of opportunity to conspire as circumstantial
evidence, some courts seem to require direct evidence of collusion
before treating opportunity as having probative value. For example, in
Williamson Oil Co. v. Phillip Morris USA,87 a case in which tobacco
retailers accused tobacco manufacturers of fixing the price of
cigarettes, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the opportunity to fix prices
without any showing that appellees actually conspired does not tend to
exclude the possibility that they did not avail themselves of such
opportunity or, conversely, that they actually did conspire.”88 The
court’s language suggests that the opportunity to fix prices does not
support any inference of actual conspiracy unless the plaintiffs can
separately prove that the defendants “actually conspired.” This
formulation essentially eliminates opportunity as a plus factor because
if the plaintiff could already show that the defendants “actually
conspired,” the plaintiff would not need to raise the opportunity to
conspire as a plus factor.

inferred merely from the fact of meetings between persons engaged in competing
businesses, which is not the law”).
84. CONNOR, supra note 25, at 32 (“In some cases, cartels create sham associations
with fake agendas as a cover for illegal price discussions.”); Griffin, supra note 22, at
121–22 (“Another characteristic of international cartels is that they frequently use
trade associations as a means of providing ‘cover’ for their cartel activities.”).
85. Petruzzi’s, 998 F.2d at 1244 n.17 (“[T]he testimony relating to the defendants’
opportunity to conspire and the solicitation of others to partake in common action is
also relevant.”).
86. See, e.g., Re/Max Int’l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1009 (6th Cir.
1999) (listing as plus factor “whether the defendants have exchanged or have had the
opportunity to exchange information relative to the alleged conspiracy”); In re Pool
Prods. Distrib. Mkt. Antitrust Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 2013) (“Plus
factors
identified
by
courts
and
commentators
include . . .
an opportunity to conspire . . . .”); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 38,
59 (E.D. Pa. 2007).
87. 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
88. Id. at 1319.
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The Eleventh Circuit’s conversion of opportunity from relevant plus
factor into irrelevant fact has proven influential,89 and what the
Eleventh Circuit implied, other courts have made explicit. For
example, in In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litigation,90 a
case involving a buyers-side price-fixing cartel, the court disparaged the
plaintiffs’ evidence that the defendants had “held several meetings” in
which buyer efforts to reduce prices were discussed.91 The court granted
the defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law because the
“[p]laintiffs failed to present direct evidence that illegal discussions or
conspiratorial conduct occurred at these meetings.”92 The judge
seemed to think that opportunity to conspire was not a plus factor
because there was no “direct evidence” that the opportunity led to
illegal discussions or agreements. If, however, the plaintiffs had such
direct evidence of an agreement, they would not need to proffer the
opportunity to conspire as a plus factor that could support an
inference of an agreement.
Some courts have also asserted that the opportunity to conspire is
not a plus factor at all unless the plaintiffs have separate proof of
collusion. For example, one district judge asserted that the showings
that “[d]efendants’ key decision-makers met at trade shows and
summits . . . don’t really amount to ‘plus factors’ either, because all
they show is that Defendants’ decision-makers had the opportunity to
communicate or meet to reach agreements, or to enter into a conspiracy—
not that they did.”93 Under this formulation, the opportunity to conspire
ceases to be a plus factor. Similarly, another district court explicitly
stated that an “‘opportunity to conspire’ without a showing of actual
conspiracy is insufficient to create a plus factor which would survive

89. For example, a Kansas state court “rejected” opportunity as a plus factor by
quoting the Eleventh Circuit’s Williamson opinion discounting the opportunity to fix
prices absent proof of actual collusion. Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 669
(Kan. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1319 in granting
summary judgment to defendant); see also In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., Cheese
Antitrust Litig., 60 F. Supp. 3d 914, 959 (N.D. Ill. 2014), aff’d, 801 F.3d 758 (7th Cir.
2015) (quoting Williamson).
90. No. 94 C 897, 1999 WL 33889 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19), aff’d in part, vacated in part,
186 F.3d 781 (7th Cir. 1999).
91. Id. at *16.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. In re Nat’l Ass’n of Music Merchs., Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust
Litig., No. 09CV2002, 2012 WL 3637291, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2012), aff’d sub
nom. In re Musical Instruments & Equip. Antitrust Litig., 798 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2015).
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summary judgment.”94 In particular, the defendants’ common membership
in “alliances, trade associations, and other cooperative ventures” that give
the defendants opportunity to conspire “do not create a plus factor or
even an inference of conspiracy.”95 Both of these decisions confused the
existence of evidence with the sufficiency of evidence. The opportunity to
conspire is always a plus factor, but one whose strength must be judged as
part of the plaintiff’s bundle of proffered plus factors.96
All of the above antitrust decisions distort the relationship between
plus factors and proof. Plus factors are a type of proof. Courts are
correct to hold that the opportunity to conspire alone is insufficient to
prove a price-fixing conspiracy occurred.97 But many courts have held
that because the evidence of opportunity to conspire fell short of
proving that the defendants “actually conspired,” that meant that the
opportunity to conspire was not a plus factor at all.98 These opinions
are Kafkaesque: if the opportunity to conspire is not a plus factor
unless the plaintiff can separately prove the defendants “actually

94. Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 652, 664 n.12 (E.D.N.C. 2003)
(emphasis added), aff’d sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App’x 680 (4th Cir.
2004) (per curiam).
95. Id. at 672, 678. The court asserted that because the plaintiff did not present
“evidence of actual knowledge of, and participation in, an illegal scheme,” the defendant
was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 678.
96. Leslie, Probative Synergy, supra note 76.
97. The mere fact of meetings among competitors does not prove an agreement.
For example, to survive a motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs should present
“additional evidence that would permit an inference that the meetings led to an illegal
agreement.” Sancap Abrasives Corp. v. Swiss Indus. Abrasives, 19 F. App’x 181, 189–90
(6th Cir. 2001).
98. Other courts have also implicitly required direct evidence by condemning
plaintiffs for not providing “evidence . . . that any actual collusion occurred at these
meetings, or that the conspiracy was formed or advanced at any particular meeting or
meetings.” In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 788, 806 (N.D. Ill.
2014), aff’d, 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015). The court here failed to appreciate that the
timing of price changes is the circumstantial evidence that price was discussed at
meetings. Id. (“Although plaintiffs reference the existence of communications involving
defendants that are temporally near some of the pricing changes at issue here, they offer
nothing other than speculation about the substance of these talks.”); see also In re
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 412 (3rd Cir. 2015) (“Evidence
of a disconnected foreign conspiracy, limited possession of advance pricing information,
mere opportunities to conspire without suspect meetings or conversations about pricing,
conduct that is consistent with pre-conspiracy conduct, and a weak showing of pretext
do not support a reasonable inference of a conspiracy.”); Smith v. Philip Morris Cos.,
335 P.3d 644, 669 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014) (finding that the opportunity to fix prices is
not a plus factor absent proof that the defendants “actually conspired”).
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conspired,” then the plus factor only exists when it is superfluous. After
all, if the plaintiff could show that the defendants actually conspired,
then the plaintiff would not need to use the plus-factor approach in
the first place.
2. Inter-competitor communications
Price-fixing conspiracies generally rely on some form of communications
between rival firms in order to form and manage their illegal cartel
operations. All federal circuits recognize that communication among
competitors is a plus factor for proving a price-fixing conspiracy
through circumstantial evidence.99 This makes sense because intercompetitor communications help the conspirators to reach an initial
collusive agreement and to negotiate the cartel details—including
prices, production levels, exchange rates, and market allocation.
Ongoing communications may be necessary for cartel enforcement as
the conspirators monitor each other for cheating and implement
remedies to redress any violations of the cartel allotments.100 Finally,
greater communications among conspirators helps build trust, which
is often necessary for market rivals to come together and agree to
commit a felony.101
Despite its status as a well-recognized and universally accepted plus
factor, several courts have interpreted or applied the inter-competitor
communications plus factor in a manner that deprives it of its probative
value. For example, the district court in In re Chocolate Confectionary
Antitrust Litigation102 quoted Third Circuit precedent for the proposition
99. See, e.g., SD3, LLC v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 801 F.3d 412, 432 (4th Cir. 2015)
(“Allegations of communications and meetings among conspirators can support an
inference of agreement because they provide the means and opportunity to conspire.”)
(citing Evergreen Partnering Grp., Inc. v. Pactiv Corp., 720 F.3d 33, 49 (1st Cir. 2013));
Hyland v. HomeServices of Am., Inc., 771 F.3d 310, 320 (6th Cir. 2014); Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore v. Citigroup, Inc., 709 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2013); Blomkest
Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc)
(“Courts have held that a high level of communications among competitors can
constitute a plus factor which, when combined with parallel behavior, supports an
inference of conspiracy.”) (citing In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633–34
(5th Cir. 1981)); In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 983
(N.D. Ohio 2015) (“Evidence of communications between competitors can serve as
circumstantial evidence of price-fixing.”).
100. See Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64
VAND. L. REV. 813, 842–43 (2011).
101. Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 538–39
(2004) [hereinafter Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust].
102. 999 F. Supp. 2d 777 (M.D. Pa. 2014), aff’d, 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015).
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that “[c]ommunications between competitors do not permit an inference
of an agreement to fix prices unless those communications rise to the level
of an agreement, tacit or otherwise.”103 As written, this standard makes
inter-competitor communications essentially irrelevant unless the
plaintiff can prove that these communications were themselves the
illegal agreement. But this formulation fails to recognize that
communications could be circumstantial evidence of illegal collusion
because they were prefatory to the conspiracy or related to issues of
cartel enforcement (such as reporting cheating or discussing penalties
for suspected cheaters).104 In other words, the inter-competitor
communications do not themselves have to “rise to the level of an
agreement” in order for them to be probative of collusion. Members
of illegal cartels communicate for many reasons besides forming the
initial agreement. Nevertheless, the district court invoked this phrase
to discount the evidence provided by the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Robert
Tollison, an expert economist who studies markets and cartel
behavior. When Dr. Tollison explained why the defendants’ intercompetitor communications were a plus factor, the court disparaged the
expert’s informed opinion because he was “unable to point to anything
beyond his own speculation to establish that defendants’ executives
discussed collusive price increases” during their conversations.105 The
court’s approach fundamentally fails to understand the difference
between circumstantial and direct evidence. If Dr. Tollison could prove
that the competitors actually colluded on price in their discussions at
trade shows, that would be direct evidence of an agreement.106 The
plaintiffs wouldn’t need to use the plus-factor framework at all. Indeed,
they wouldn’t need an expert on cartel behavior; they could just point
to the direct evidence of a conspiracy.
Courts routinely fail to appreciate how inter-competitor communications
serve several functions for a cartel. For example, in In re Citric Acid
Litigation,107 the Ninth Circuit considered a district court’s grant of
summary judgment in a civil case in which four out of the five leading
manufacturers of citric acid had already pleaded guilty to criminal

103. Id. at 800 (quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3rd Cir.
1999)); see infra notes 142–53 (critiquing this aspect of the In re Baby Food opinion).
104. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 101, at 610–20.
105. In re Chocolate, 999 F. Supp. 2d at 804.
106. See Page, supra note 44, at 443 (“Evidence is only direct if it spells out the terms
of the communications, which in turn meet the definition of agreement.”).
107. 191 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 1999).
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price fixing but the fifth firm, Cargill, maintained its innocence.108 To
make their case, the plaintiffs showed that Cargill had followed similar
pricing to the known price fixers and “that representatives of Cargill
attended meetings and had telephone conversations with individuals
who have been identified as” the ringleaders and foot soldiers of the
cartel.109 The Ninth Circuit deprived these communications of
probative value—even though they were conversations with admitted
price fixers—because the plaintiffs did “not offer any specific details
with regard to illegal discussions.”110 The appellate panel conceded
that Cargill met with the convicted price fixers, but then the court
demanded too much from the plaintiffs given that they were using
circumstantial evidence to survive a summary judgment motion. If the
plaintiff’s evidence of inter-competitor communications needs to spell
out the specific illegal content of those communications, then this
requires the plaintiff to present direct evidence of a price-fixing
agreement.111 The In re Citric Acid plaintiffs had already detailed the
time and participants of the communications.112 For the court to
require even more “specific details with regard to illegal discussions” is
essentially a demand for direct evidence of an illegal agreement.113
Some courts use language that comes close to eliminating inter-firm
communications as a plus factor altogether when the plaintiff does not
know the contents of the discussions. For example, in In re Travel Agent
Commission Antitrust Litigation,114 the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of the plaintiff’s price-fixing claim because—despite the complaint’s
allegations of inter-rival communications—the plaintiff’s “allegations,
however, aver[red] only an opportunity to conspire, which does not
necessarily support an inference of illegal agreement.”115 The Sixth
108. Id. at 1092–93.
109. Id. at 1103. The cartel had used the language of “masters and sherpas” to
describe the cartel’s participants. Id.
110. Id.
111. Page, supra note 44, at 443.
112. In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1103.
113. Similarly, some courts have suggested coordination with competitors through
trade associations and joint ventures is not a plus factor when the plaintiff lacks
evidence that the defendant “has participated in any collusive activity through its
memberships in these business ventures.” Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp.
2d 652, 666–67 (E.D.N.C. 2003) (granting summary judgment to defendant), aff’d sub
nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App’x 680 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). This
seems like a requirement of direct evidence of agreement.
114. 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009).
115. Id. at 905.
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Circuit’s reasoning is wrong; inter-competitor communications are a
plus factor and can indeed “support an inference of illegal agreement.”
They may not be enough on their own to prove an agreement, but they
are still circumstantial evidence. The Sixth Circuit opinion seems to
undermine both opportunity and communications as plus factors
when the details of the communications are unknown at the time that
the complaint is filed and before discovery has taken place.116
Requiring such a level of detail about conspiratorial meetings is
particularly unreasonable when plaintiffs have not had the benefit of
full discovery.117
The judicial urge to deny the probative value of inter-firm
communications absent separate proof of an underlying antitrust
conspiracy is not limited to purely price-fixing claims. In Rosefielde v.
Falcon Jet Corp.,118 a New Jersey district court considered an alleged
conspiracy to prevent the resale of business jets and to fix prices.119
After noting that “[a] high level of interfirm communications is one of the
‘plus factors’ which may indicate the defendants were engaged in collusive
anticompetitive behavior,”120 the court diminished the significance of the
defendant’s inter-competitor meetings because the defendants’ notes did
not memorialize their illegal agreement.121 Instead, the court reasoned
that the plaintiffs could not prove that during the communications the
defendants agreed to take collective action to restrain trade even though
after their meetings “each of the four alleged conspirators took significant
steps to deter the resale of new business jets, an anticompetitive objective
under the Sherman Act.”122 The rival firms’ simultaneous action on the
heels of their inter-competitor communications is circumstantial evidence
that—combined with other plus factors—could allow a reasonable jury to
infer a conspiracy.123 Yet, the court rejected this circumstantial

116. See generally Christine P. Bartholomew, Twiqbal in Context, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC.
744 (2016).
117. Leslie, Price-Fixing Conspiracy, supra note 11.
118. 701 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J. 1988).
119. Id. at 1055.
120. Id. at 1074.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1073.
123. See In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 163 F. Supp. 3d 175, 197 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (“[O]pportunities to conspire may be probative of a conspiracy when meetings
of Defendants are closely followed in time by suspicious actions or records.”); Stop &
Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 239 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187
(D.R.I. 2003) (noting that inter-competitor meetings are more probative of collusion
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evidence, because it fell short of being direct evidence. Similarly, in a
footnote considering the plaintiffs’ price-fixing claims, the district
court’s language improperly implied a requirement of direct evidence,
noting that “[p]laintiffs admit there is no direct evidence of an express
agreement to fix prices in the industry; therefore, defendants are granted
summary judgment with respect to the existence of an express agreement
to fix prices.”124 One hopes that this language is unintentionally careless
because it incorrectly suggests that plaintiffs bringing price-fixing
claims must present direct evidence in order to survive summary
judgment, which is unquestionably incorrect.125 Whatever the intent
behind this particular phrasing, the court’s approach minimized the
significance of inter-firm communications as a plus factor.
In sum, several courts have interpreted the inter-competitor
communications plus factor in a manner that essentially necessitates direct
evidence of an agreement in order for this plus factor to count as
circumstantial evidence.126 While frequent meetings among rival firms
alone do not prove conspiracy, evidence of such meetings is an
important plus factor that helps create a circumstantial case when
combined with other evidence.127 To require specific details about
contents of inter-competitor meetings is to require direct evidence of
collusion.128 Courts should not require direct evidence of the content
of inter-competitor communications in order for those communications

when “followed shortly thereafter by parallel behavior that goes beyond what would be
expected absent an agreement”), aff’d, 373 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2004).
124. Rosefielde, 701 F. Supp. at 1061 n.13 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
125. See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 629 (7th Cir. 2010); In
re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal.
2007).
126. See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 152 F. Supp. 3d 234,
250–51 (D. Del. 2016), aff’d, 873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017) (granting summary judgment
to defendants because plaintiffs’ evidence of inter-competitor communications did not
include “explicit agreement between competitors”); In re Hawaiian & Guamanian
Cabotage Antitrust Litig., 647 F. Supp. 2d 1250, 1259 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (“[P]laintiffs
here do not identify any specific communications or contracts.”).
127. Venture Tech., Inc. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Co., 685 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1982) (quoting
Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 639 F.2d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1980)) (“[F]requent meetings
between the alleged conspirators . . . will not sustain a plaintiff’s burden absent evidence
which would permit the inference that those close ties led to an illegal agreement.”).
128. In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 587 F. Supp. 2d 27, 34 (D.D.C.
2008) (“Short of being in the boardroom at the meeting, it is hard for the Court to
imagine how plaintiffs could more fulsomely allege that defendants entered into an
agreement at the AAR meetings.”); see Page, supra note 44, at 443.
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to represent a plus factor in a plaintiff’s circumstantial case.129 If evidence
of inter-competitor communications is only given weight when it rises to
the level of direct evidence that the content of those communications
included an agreement to collude on price, then the court has
essentially eliminated plaintiffs’ ability to prove agreements through
circumstantial evidence.
3. Invitation to collude
Certain types of inter-competitor communications are particularly
symptomatic of price collusion. Notably, when one competitor in a
market solicits one or more of its rivals to fix prices, this one-way
message is highly probative of conspiracy. By itself, an invitation to
collude is already halfway to an antitrust violation. The solicitation
proves that at least one firm is ready and willing to agree to fix prices
in violation of antitrust law.130 Unsurprisingly, courts usually consider
invitations to collude an important plus factor.131
Despite this recognition, some courts have nevertheless interpreted
this plus factor in a way that undermines its usefulness. In Alakayak v.
129. Some courts have admirably resisted defendants’ efforts to convert the
communications plus factor into a direct evidence requirement. For example, in In re
Ethylene Propylene Diene Monomer (EPDM) Antitrust Litigation, 681 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D.
Conn. 2009), the defendants argued that evidence of communication must be formal
communications that “unambiguously support an inference of conspiracy.” Id. at 168–
69. The defendants argued that communication must “demonstrate conclusively” that
the defendants agreed. Id. at 175–76. That is wrong; that is demanding direct evidence.
The court rejected the defendants’ argument and held that the plaintiffs had
presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to survive the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Id. at 176.
130. In re Fortiline, LLC, No. 151-0000, 2016 WL 4379041, at *11 (F.T.C. Aug. 9,
2016) (defining an “invitation to collude” as “an improper communication from a firm
to an actual or potential competitor that the firm is ready and willing to coordinate on
price or output or other important terms of competition”).
131. See In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1372
(N.D. Ga. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 714 F. App’x 986 (11th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (“Numerous cases have recognized that an invitation to
collude can serve as evidence of a conspiracy.” (citing Interstate Circuit v. United
States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939))); Fishman v. Wirtz, No. 78 C 3621, 1981 WL 2153, at
*59 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 28, 1981) (“One of the strongest circumstantial indicators of a
conspiracy is the existence of a common invitation or request to join into a concerted
plan of action.”); Gainesville Utils. Dep’t v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 573 F.2d 292, 300–
01 (5th Cir. 1978); see also Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d
1028, 1045 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (noting that an invitation
to collude “shows conspiratorial state of mind on the part of the solicitor and may also
indicate that the solicitor was acting upon an earlier agreement”).

1740

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69:1713

British Columbia Packers, Ltd.,132 the Alaska Supreme Court noted that
“evidence of a traditional conspiracy agreement is a ‘plus factor,’” but
then asserted that a plaintiff’s evidence “does not qualify as such unless
there is evidence of both an invitation to collude, as well as acceptance
of that invitation.”133 Other courts have similarly implied that solicitations
to fix price are meaningless unless the plaintiff proffers direct evidence
that the invitees accepted the offer and, thus, formed a conspiracy.134
Finally, some courts have held that “a conspiracy to fix prices can be
inferred from an invitation, followed by responsive assurances and
conduct.”135 What this passage describes, however, is not an inference
of agreement from circumstantial evidence but an actual agreement
proven through direct evidence.
Such treatment of invitations to collude confuses plus factors with
proof of agreement. If the plaintiff must show both solicitation and
acceptance for the invitation to collude to be a plus factor, then the
plaintiff is not really using plus factors so much as it is proving an actual
agreement by showing the classic common law definition of mutual
assent: offer and acceptance. For example, the Supreme Court in
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States136 held that “[a]cceptance by
competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate
in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried out, is
restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlawful
conspiracy under the Sherman Act.”137 In other words, requiring both
proof of invitation and of acceptance eschews the plus-factor approach
altogether. The offer-and-acceptance approach to proving an agreement
uses the mutual assent test of contract law, not the plus-factor framework
of antitrust law. Yet, were the plaintiffs to possess proof of offer and
acceptance, they would not need circumstantial evidence at all. If
courts require proof of acceptance as a prerequisite to giving an
132. 48 P.3d 432 (Alaska 2002).
133. Id. at 458 (emphasis added). The Alaska Supreme Court ultimately found
evidence of both invitation and acceptance on the facts before it. Id.
134. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1045 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (criticizing
majority’s failure to appreciate significance of “evidence that various defendants
invited others to join in stabilizing prices [because] the class was not able to adduce
direct evidence that the people on the receiving end of these solicitations accepted
them and formed a deal”). The Blomkest majority ultimately discounted the “significant
evidence of solicitations to enter a price-fixing agreement.” Id. at 1038, 1044.
135. In re TFT—LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 586 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1116 (N.D.
Cal. 2008).
136. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
137. Id. at 227.
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invitation to collude any probative value, they have effectively eliminated
the invitation to collude as an independent plus factor, albeit without
acknowledging that they are doing so.
4. Exchange of price information
Courts also recognize another subspecies of inter-competitor
communication, the inter-firm exchange of price information, as a
separate plus factor. Price-fixing conspirators commonly share their
confidential pricing information with each other.138 Disclosing price
data can inform cartel negotiations as to what the fixed price should
be and how it should be modified over time and across various
geographic markets.139 Price exchanges also provide a monitoring
mechanism so that cartel members can more easily determine whether
any of their partners are cheating on the cartel agreement by charging
a price below the one fixed by the cartel.140 For these reasons, courts
treat inter-competitor price exchanges as a plus factor.141
Despite its inherent probative value as circumstantial evidence of
collusion, some courts have suggested that the exchange of price
information among competitors does not support an inference of
conspiracy unless the plaintiff presents separate proof of an
agreement. In In re Baby Food Antitrust Litigation,142 the Third Circuit

138. See, e.g., In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655 F.2d 627, 633–34 (5th Cir. 1981).
139. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1047 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“The price
communications in this case are more like those in In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings,
906 F.2d at 448, which served little purpose other than facilitating price
coordination.”).
140. Id. (“[I]f there were a cartel, it would be crucial for the cartel members to
cooperate in telling each other about actual prices charged in order to prevent the
sort of widespread discounting that would eventually sink the cartel.”); ABA SECTION
OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE HANDBOOK ch. IV.B (4th ed. 2010),
LexisNexis (“Exchanges of price information . . . facilitate[] the competitors’
detecting others ‘cheating’ on their tacit agreement.”).
141. Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (describing
“exchange of price information and opportunity to meet” as plus factor); Wilcox v.
First Interstate Bank of Or., N.A., 815 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing
“exchange of price information” as plus factor); In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Sec. Litig., 275
F. Supp. 3d 970, 995 (W.D. Ark. 2017) (“The broadcasting of sensitive business
information . . . is . . . circumstantial evidence of a conspiracy among competitors.”)
(alteration in original) (quotation omitted); Ash v. Hack Branch Distrib. Co., 54
S.W.3d 401, 419 (Tex. App. 2001) (“[Plus] factors traditionally include price
parallelism, product uniformity, exchange of price information, and the opportunity
for the alleged conspirators to meet to formulate illegal policies.”).
142. 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999).
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considered plaintiffs’ claims that three major baby manufacturers—
Gerber, Beech-Nut, and Heinz, which collectively controlled over 98%
of the American market—conspired to raise and stabilize the price of
baby food.143 Although the plaintiffs provided evidence of parallel
pricing and significant inter-rival communications regarding future
price increases, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the
defendants, reasoning in part that “communications between competitors
do not permit an inference of an agreement to fix prices unless those
communications rise to the level of an agreement, tacit or otherwise.”144
The court’s formulation here is troubling because it suggests that price
exchanges are not circumstantial evidence of collusion unless the plaintiff
can prove that those suspicious communications are themselves an illegal
agreement. The Third Circuit’s approach is flawed because these intercompetitor price exchanges are not necessarily the illegal agreement.
Rather, they are circumstantial evidence of cartel management and cartel
enforcement, which helps the factfinder determine whether there is an
underlying agreement to fix prices.
The Third Circuit opinion seems to conflate the two separate roles
that inter-competitor price exchanges can play in establishing antitrust
liability. Price exchanges can themselves, under certain circumstances,
violate Section 1 when the exchange has the purpose or effect of
stabilizing prices.145 But this has little to do with how the sharing of
price data constitutes a plus factor. These are two separate inquiries.
The Ninth Circuit has correctly explained that inter-competitor
information exchanges help to establish an antitrust violation only
when either (1) the exchange indicates the existence of an express
or tacit agreement to fix or stabilize prices, or (2) the exchange is
made pursuant to an express or tacit agreement that is itself a
violation of § 1 under a rule of reason analysis.146

The inter-firm sharing of price information has different legal
significance depending on which path the antitrust plaintiff is taking.
The first path treats price exchanges as a plus factor that plaintiffs can
143. Id. at 118.
144. Id. at 126 (quotations omitted).
145. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969) (“The
exchange of price data tends toward price uniformity.”).
146. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig.,
906 F.2d 432, 447 n.13 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); Page, supra note 44, at 431
(“An information exchange may be unlawful if it is found to have an unreasonable
effect on prices, or if it is found to be a plus factor permitting an inference of a per se
illegal agreement to fix prices.”).
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use as circumstantial evidence to prove an agreement to fix prices,
which is per se illegal.147 The second path treats agreements to
exchange price information as a separate antitrust claim, which courts
evaluate under the Rule of Reason.148 In other words, a horizontal
agreement to exchange price information might violate the Sherman
Act. In contrast, a horizontal agreement to fix prices does violate the
Sherman Act because it is per se illegal. And evidence that competitors
are exchanging price information can help prove that there is an
underlying agreement to fix prices.
The In re Baby Food opinion confused these two distinct inquiries. In
In re Baby Food, the Third Circuit evaluated the plaintiffs’ plus factor
under the second path, as if the plus factor has to be an antitrust
violation unto itself. That is wrong because the plaintiff was proffering
the defendants’ exchange of price information as a plus factor—i.e., as
evidence to prove an agreement under path one—not as an
independent violation under path two. In other words, the plaintiff was
arguing that the price “exchange indicates the existence of an express
or tacit agreement to fix or stabilize prices,” not that the price
exchange was itself illegal.149 The court was wrong to suggest that the
price exchanges did not constitute circumstantial evidence because
the communications themselves were not illegal. There is no
requirement that plus factors be independently illegal. Thus, the Third
Circuit erred when it asserted that inter-competitor price exchanges
do not support an inference of collusion.
Moreover, the In re Baby Food approach is based on a misreading of
precedent. In diminishing inter-competitor price exchanges as a plus
factor, the Third Circuit cited as its sole support the case of Alvord-Polk,
Inc. v. F. Schumacher & Co.150 But Alvord-Polk did not hold that intercompetitor communications were not evidence of conspiracy unless
147. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1046 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“In price fixing cases, the exchange of
sensitive price information can sometimes be circumstantial evidence of the existence
of a per se violation.”); Morton Salt Co. v. United States, 235 F.2d 573, 577 (10th Cir.
1956) (inter-competitor exchange of price information “is a factor appropriately
considered in determining the existence of a conspiracy”).
148. See, e.g., In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“Exchanges of information are not considered a per se violation because ‘such
practices can in certain circumstances increase economic efficiency and render
markets more, rather than less, competitive.’” (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16 (1978))).
149. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods., 906 F.2d at 447 n.13.
150. 37 F.3d 996 (3d Cir. 1994).
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the communications themselves constituted an agreement. The court
in Alvord-Polk merely stated the uncontroversial proposition that
“[c]ommunications alone, although more suspicious among competitors
than between a manufacturer and its distributors, do not necessarily
result in liability.”151 In other words, the Alvord-Polk court said that
communications themselves are not illegal unless they “rise to the level of
an agreement.”152 The In re Baby Food court misconstrued Alvord-Polk to
hold that communications are not evidence unless the plaintiff can
separately prove an agreement. But something can be evidence of an
illegal agreement without being illegal in and of itself.153
Despite its fundamental mistake, the In re Baby Food court’s approach
has influenced many courts. Several judges have invoked In re Baby
Food’s operative language—that “[c]ommunications between
competitors do not permit an inference of an agreement to fix prices
unless those communications rise to the level of an agreement, tacit or
otherwise”—in order to deprive evidence of inter-competitor
communication of probative value and to grant summary judgment to
defendants.154 For example, the Ninth Circuit in In re Citric Acid,
discussed previously,155 quoted In re Baby Food to affirm summary
judgment for Cargill, which had been accused of conspiring to fix
prices for citric acid with four of its competitors.156 Cargill executives
had had several meetings and telephone conversations with their
counterparts at the four putative rivals, who had already been
151. Id. at 1013.
152. Id. (“[I]t is only when those communications rise to the level of an agreement,
tacit or otherwise, that they become an antitrust violation.”).
153. Christopher R. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, 67 DUKE L.J. 557, 597
(2017) [hereinafter Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies].
154. See, e.g., In re Delta/Airtran Baggage Fee Antitrust Litig., 245 F. Supp. 3d 1343,
1375 (N.D. Ga. 2017) (quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d
Cir. 1999)), aff’d sub nom. Siegel v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 714 F. App’x 986 (11th Cir.
2018) (per curiam); Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow Grp. Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d
505, 516 (D. Del. 2010) (quoting In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 126); Holiday Wholesale
Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1308 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (quoting
In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 126), aff’d, 346 F.3d 1287 (11 Cir. 2003); see also Bailey
Lumber & Supply Co. v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., No. 1:08CV1394 LG-JMR, 2010 WL
1141133, at *4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 19, 2010) (invoking In re Baby Food’s operative language
to assert “there is nothing inherently improper with competitors communicating with
one another”); cf. In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 152 F. Supp. 3d 968, 983
(N.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting In re Baby Food’s operative language but denying summary
judgment).
155. See supra notes 107–13.
156. 191 F.3d 1090, 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1999).
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convicted of criminal price fixing and had settled the private litigation
that Cargill was challenging. The Ninth Circuit invoked In re Baby
Food’s operative language to condemn the plaintiff who did “not offer
any specific details with regard to illegal discussions, but instead merely
asks us to infer participation in the conspiracy from the opportunity to
do so. Such meetings, at least in and of themselves, do not tend to
exclude the possibility of legitimate activity.”157 While In re Baby Food’s
reasoning is inherently suspect, this is a particularly dubious use of
persuasive authority given that In re Citric Acid involved a defendant
repeatedly communicating with competitors who were actively conspiring
to fix prices. Moreover, it was later revealed that one conspirator
informed the FBI that Cargill had in fact participated in the illegal
cartel.158 In short, the inter-competitor exchange of price plans is
always circumstantial evidence when such pricing discussions are
correlated with parallel pricing. Plaintiffs do not need direct evidence
of an illegal agreement in order for this form of circumstantial
evidence to constitute a plus factor.
5. Possession of competitors’ price-related documents
In a competitive market, firms generally keep their future pricing
plans to themselves. Pricing information has strategic value. In contrast,
firms in an illegal cartel relationship often share their confidential
documents.159 The act of revealing private information builds trust
among rivals and, thus, can help stabilize price-fixing conspiracies.160
Because the possession of rivals’ proprietary records is more consistent
with collusion than with competition,161 courts treat an antitrust
defendant’s possession of a competitor’s price-related documents as a
plus factor.162
Of course, possession of competitors’ documents does not itself
prove price fixing because there may be an innocent, non-collusive
explanation. A competitive firm may obtain its rival’s pricing
information in ways unrelated to an antitrust conspiracy, such as
157. Id. at 1103.
158. David Barboza, Archer Daniels Executive Said to Tell of Price-Fixing Talks with Cargill
Counterpart, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at C6.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Therm-All, Inc., 373 F.3d 625, 629 (5th Cir. 2004).
160. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 101, at 572.
161. See In re High Pressure Laminates Antitrust Litig., No. 00 MDL 1368(CLB),
2006 WL 1317023, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2006).
162. See, e.g., In re Bulk Popcorn Antitrust Litig., 783 F. Supp. 1194, 1196 (D. Minn.
1991).
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through industrial espionage or transmission by a mutual customer.163
This latter explanation, however, is likely inapplicable when a firm has
its rival’s non-public—or pre-announced—pricing documents, as has
happened in many antitrust cases.164
Nevertheless, some courts have chastised antitrust plaintiffs for not
providing evidence of how competitors’ confidential memos came into
the possession of their rival.165 For example, the Third Circuit has
diminished the probative value of this plus factor by observing that the
“[p]laintiffs pointed to a few competitors’ memos in sales files, but
there was no evidence of how the documents got there.”166 Yet the
Third Circuit has also granted summary judgment for price-fixing
defendants even when the defendants had “no explanation as to how they
obtained [pricing] information” of their alleged co-conspirators.167 This
asymmetry of burdens is both troubling and illogical: the plaintiff must
show how these sensitive documents got into the defendant’s files, but
the defendant (who actually acquired and retained the documents)
does not have to do so. That is one step closer to requiring that
antitrust plaintiffs present direct evidence of collusion. For example, if
the plaintiff must prove that the competitors’ confidential pricing
memoranda were exchanged as part of a price-fixing conspiracy, then
that essentially requires proving a conspiracy as a prerequisite to
crediting this circumstantial evidence.
6. Exchange of sales data
Like the sharing of sensitive pricing information, the intercompetitor exchange of sales data is often part and parcel of a pricefixing arrangement. Cartel members circulate their production and
sales data for many reasons, including assisting in allocating market

163. See, e.g., Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 996
n.9 (4th Cir. 1990) (“When asked in his deposition how Olan Mills obtained the
Kinder-Care price list, the Olan Mills local representative stated that he got the list
from his son who attends a local high school.”).
164. See, e.g., In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 392 (3d
Cir. 2015); In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 119 (3d Cir. 1999).
165. In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1099 (9th Cir. 1999) (crediting
defendant’s explanation at summary judgment that it had firm-specific data on its rivals
because of “its own internal market research . . . [because the plaintiff] offered no
evidence to the contrary”).
166. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing In
re Baby Food).
167. In re Chocolate, 801 F.3d at 408 (discussing In re Baby Food).
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share.168 More importantly, price fixers share sales data in order to
monitor each other’s sales activities to ensure that no firm is cheating
on the cartel agreement by selling more than their cartel allotment.169
Because sharing sales data stabilizes cartels—and is often employed by
cartels—courts treat this as a plus factor.170
Despite the fact that exchanging sales data is a classic tactic used by
price-fixing cartels to monitor their members, some courts require
direct evidence of a conspiracy before crediting inter-competitor data
sharing as a plus factor. In Williamson, the Eleventh Circuit asserted
that the plaintiff needed to prove an agreement among the defendants
to misuse their shared sales data in order for collective monitoring of
sales to be a plus factor.171 The court reasoned that “although the
sharing of information can be seen as suggesting conspiracy, . . . it also
can be seen equally as a necessary means to the receipt of its
competitors’ information.”172 The court’s analysis devalues intercompetitor sales-data sharing as a plus factor and is remarkable for
several reasons. First, the sharing sales data among competitors is a
plus factor in and of itself.173 There is no additional requirement of
data misuse.
Second, to require proof of misuse is tantamount to requiring
independent proof of conspiracy. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach, sharing sales data is not a plus factor unless the data was
168. See, e.g., MARCO BERTILORENZI, THE INTERNATIONAL ALUMINIUM CARTEL, 1886–
1978: THE BUSINESS AND POLITICS OF A COOPERATIVE INDUSTRIAL INSTITUTION 136
(Taylor & Francis eds., 2016) (“Since the [aluminum] cartel provided a reliable
statistical survey that allowed forecasting of market trends, it was considered useful to
set optimal output rates in this context of growth.”).
169. William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH.
L. REV. 393, 424 (2011) (“The conveyance of firm-specific production and sales
information is important for monitoring compliance with many cartel agreements.”);
CONNOR, supra note 37, at 294–95 (discussing the vitamin B2 cartel).
170. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that plus factors
include facilitating practices, such as inter-competitor information exchanges); In re
Ductile Iron Pipe Fittings (DIPF) Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-711, 2013
WL 812143, at *13 (D.N.J. Mar. 5, 2013) (discussing defendants “shar[ing] current
market information concerning the volume of Defendants’ sales” and noting that
“participation in information exchanges in highly concentrated markets involving a
fungible product with inelastic demand can be indicative of anticompetitive
behavior”); In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 773 F. Supp. 2d 351, 369
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
171. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1315 (11th Cir. 2003).
172. Id. at 1313.
173. See cases cited supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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misused pursuant to a price-fixing conspiracy, which means that the
plaintiffs must prove a conspiracy in order to show that the shared data
was misused by the conspirators. But if the plaintiffs could make this
showing of conspiracy, they would not need to use the inter-competitor
data exchange as a plus factor in the first place.
Third, in exonerating the price-fixing defendants, the Eleventh
Circuit does not seem to realize that it is justifying cartel conduct writ
large. The court thought it perfectly rational that each firm shared its
confidential data as the price of getting its rivals to correspondingly
share their confidential data.174 While the Williamson court saw this as
an innocent explanation, what the court described is the essence of
collusion: cartel members share their sensitive data as part of the
conspiracy.175 The court’s analysis did not explain why the defendants’
activity was not collusive; instead, it justified cartel behavior as permissible
because each of the co-conspirators profits from its participation in the
inter-competitor exchange of sensitive sales data.176 The opinion, thus,
turns antitrust doctrine on its head. Unfortunately, the Eleventh
Circuit’s Williamson mistreatment of sales data as a plus factor is not a
complete aberration.177
7. Evidence of foreign price fixing
In some price-fixing cases, plaintiffs who claim that the defendants
are fixing prices in the American market present evidence that the
defendants have fixed—or are currently fixing—prices in foreign
markets. This evidence can include actual guilty pleas or findings of guilt
in foreign jurisdictions but may instead involve strong circumstantial
evidence of foreign collusion. Such evidence is probative of price fixing
in the American market for several reasons. First, it shows that the
defendants have solved the coordination and trust problems that can
make cartel formation and maintenance unfeasibly difficult.178 Foreign
174. Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1313 (“If a particular manufacturer ceased
providing its own information, its entitlement to that of its competitors would similarly
end.”).
175. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 101, at 539.
176. Williamson Oil Co., 346 F.3d at 1313.
177. See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 198
(3d Cir. 2017).
178. Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 100, at 825; Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing
Conspiracies, supra note 153, at 584 (“Launching an international cartel requires
significant coordination among rival firms that come from different corporate
cultures, often speak different languages, and may be generally reluctant to cooperate
with their competitors.”).
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cartels often provide a dry run for competitors who are intent on fixing
the prices charged to American consumers.179 Moreover, if a group of
multinational corporations is fixing prices in foreign markets, they
have a strong motive to fix American prices as well because the
asymmetry of prices across international markets creates opportunities
for arbitrage and may provide competition authorities with evidence
of collusion in the higher-priced foreign market.180 For all of these
reasons, the defendants’ participation in foreign price-fixing activity
should be considered an important plus factor.181
Although it makes perfect sense why foreign price fixing is—and
should be—a plus factor for proving a domestic price-fixing conspiracy,

179. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, supra note 153, at 579–87; Leslie, Trust,
Distrust, and Antitrust, supra note 101, at 610–22.
180. Grant Butler, The Supreme Court’s Destruction of Incentive to Participate in the Justice
Department’s Cartel Leniency Program, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 169, 180 (2005) (“If a cartel
chose to fix prices only in foreign countries, arbitrageurs can purchase the goods in
the United States at the competitive market price and take them to a foreign country
where the goods could be sold at a price higher than the competitive price but lower
than the fixed price of the cartel.”); see also John M. Connor & Darren Bush, How to
Block Cartel Formation and Price Fixing: Using Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws
as a Deterrence Mechanism, 112 PA. ST. L. REV. 813, 835 (2008) (“Arbitrage undermines
the ability of international cartels to set prices at the most profitable level in each
currency zone and could even destroy collusive arrangements.”); Leslie, Foreign PriceFixing Conspiracies, supra note 153 (explaining why foreign cartels expand into the
American market in order to deter foreign consumers from purchasing lower-priced
American goods and to prevent price disparities from alerting competition authorities
to price fixing in the markets with elevated prices); Christopher Sprigman, Fix Prices
Globally, Get Sued Locally? U.S. Jurisdiction over International Cartels, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 265,
275 (2005).
181. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, supra note 153, at 591–96; see also United
States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating defendants’ participation
in a citric acid price-fixing conspiracy was relevant in a criminal case against
participants in lysine price-fixing conspiracy); In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 723
F. Supp. 2d 987, 1011 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (“[G]uilty pleas in one market are suggestive
of the plausibility of a conspiracy to commit the same illegal acts in another market.”);
In re Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) Antitrust Litig., 580 F. Supp. 2d 896, 903
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (stating guilty pleas of price fixing in the Dynamic Random Access
Memory (DRAM) market “support an inference of a conspiracy in the SRAM
industry”); In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711,
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (“Evidence of cooperation between Defendants in
foreign price-fixing, through a trade association or otherwise, would certainly be
relevant to establish the existence of an illegal combination or conspiracy in restraint
of trade” in the American market); Eddins v. Redstone, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 877 n.11
(Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing “proved conspiracy or competition in other markets
or times” as a plus factor).
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some courts have approached the issue in a manner that seems to
require direct evidence of an illegal conspiracy before crediting
foreign price fixing as circumstantial evidence of collusion. For
example, in In re Chocolate, in trying to prove that Hershey, Nestle, and
Mars conspired to fix chocolate prices in the American market, the
plaintiffs pointed to the companies’ proven illegal price-fixing activities
in Canada.182 The district court reasoned that communications related
to the proven Canadian cartel and the alleged American cartel were not
a plus factor in the case by quoting In re Baby Food for the—now
infamous and still incorrect—proposition that “[c]ommunications
between competitors do not permit an inference of an agreement to
fix prices unless those communications rise to the level of an
agreement, tacit or otherwise.”183 As noted previously, this reasoning is
inherently troubling,184 but it is particularly inappropriate when applied
in the shadow of actual price fixing occurring in foreign markets because
we know that these corporations’ prior communications included price
fixing discussions and agreements. Nonetheless, the Third Circuit
affirmed, holding that the plaintiffs could not survive summary
judgment absent evidence of “the U.S. Chocolate Manufacturers’
direct participation in or knowledge of the Canadian conspiracy.”185
This smacks of requiring direct evidence of collusion in the American
market.
The Eleventh Circuit was more explicit in requiring direct evidence
of collusion as a prerequisite for treating foreign price fixing as a plus
factor. In Williamson, the Eleventh Circuit simultaneously increased the
price-fixing plaintiff’s evidentiary burden and minimized the evidentiary
significance of foreign price-fixing conspiracies.186 The appellate court
affirmed the district court’s denial of discovery related to the
defendants’ foreign price fixing, which the district judge denied because
the plaintiffs had no “direct evidence [of] one or more price fixing
episodes” in the foreign markets during the time that the defendants

182. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 999 F. Supp. 2d 777, 780 (M.D.
Pa. 2014), aff’d, 801 F.3d 383 (3d Cir. 2015).
183. Id. at 800 (citing In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir.
1999)).
184. See supra notes 142–53.
185. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d at 405–06 (emphasis
added).
186. Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).
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were allegedly fixing prices in the American market.187 Consequently,
the court required the plaintiffs to have direct evidence of foreign
price fixing in order to conduct discovery for circumstantial evidence
to prove a plus factor for a domestic price-fixing conspiracy.
The reasoning in these opinions undermines the use of foreign price
fixing as a plus factor altogether. For example, in affirming the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, the Eleventh
Circuit in Williamson did not merely hold that the plaintiff’s evidence of
the defendants’ price-fixing activities in foreign markets was insufficient
to prove a corresponding agreement to target American consumers
with fixed prices. Instead, the court asserted that the plaintiffs’ “alleged
evidence of foreign agreements to collude does not rise to the level of
a plus factor.”188 In other words, the court’s language suggests that
absent direct evidence of foreign price fixing—which the plaintiffs
must secure without full discovery—strong circumstantial evidence
that the defendants fixed prices abroad is not circumstantial evidence
of domestic price fixing, despite all of the logical and empirical
evidence linking foreign and domestic price-fixing activities.189
These opinions are incorrect; even without direct evidence,
circumstantial evidence that price-fixing defendants have engaged (or
are engaging) in price fixing in foreign markets is a plus factor that
bolsters a plaintiff’s circumstantial case for proving that the defendants
also fixed prices in the American market. To rule otherwise invites
firms to engage in price fixing in foreign markets—where they can
perfect their mechanisms for managing, enforcing, and concealing
their cartel operations—before expanding their collusion to the U.S.
market.190 And then after the conspiracy reaches American consumers,
opinions like Williamson will make it difficult for plaintiffs to hold the
cartel accountable because U.S. courts will discount the significance of
the foreign price fixing.191 To hold that proof of a non-U.S. price fixing

187. Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253,
1312 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (emphasis added).
188. Williamson, 346 F.3d at 1317.
189. Moreover, the In re Chocolate price-fixing case involved proven illegal price
fixing in the Canadian market. Between In re Chocolate and Williamson, courts seem to
imply that it is not enough to present direct evidence that the defendants—admittedly—
fixed prices in another country, continent, or worldwide. Rather, the plaintiff must
prove that the foreign conspiracy penetrated the American border. But that is direct
evidence.
190. Leslie, Foreign Price-Fixing Conspiracies, supra note 153, at 579–87.
191. Id. at 596–613.
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conspiracy is not a plus factor unless the plaintiffs can prove with direct
evidence that the foreign price fixing occurred and that the foreign
activity had a direct effect on American prices imposes an unreasonable
burden on plaintiffs trying to make a circumstantial case that the
defendants fixed prices in the American market.
8. Artificial standardization
Markets in homogeneous products are more susceptible to
cartelization because rivals can more easily agree upon a fixed price,
divide markets, and monitor for cheating on a cartel agreement when all
of the firms in the market are selling identical products.192 To facilitate
their cartel activities, conspirators sometimes artificially standardize their
products.193 While some products require standardization to make
differently branded products interoperable, courts treat artificial
standardization as a plus factor because it benefits cartels, not consumers.194
Even though artificial standardization has been well recognized as a
plus factor for over half a century, some courts have approached the
issue in a way that confuses the relationship between plus factors and
proof. For example, in Ross v. American Express Co.,195 the plaintiffs
alleged that a group of banks had illegally conspired to impose
mandatory arbitration clauses on their customers.196 As one of their
plus factors, the plaintiffs argued that the banks’ arbitration clauses
“were all artificially standardized to incorporate class action waivers
and otherwise bar collective legal redress.”197 These changes hurt
192. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656 (7th Cir.
2002); In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 799, 822 (D. Md. 2013).
193. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952).
194. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139–40 n.10 (2d Cir.
1984); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 197 F.2d at 493; Milk & Ice Cream Can Inst. v. FTC, 152
F.2d 478, 482 (7th Cir. 1946) (“The meticulous effort disclosed by the record by which
petitioners standardized their products is also a strong circumstance in support of the
Commission’s finding that their activities were the result of an agreement.”); see also
Joseph J. Simons, Fixing Price with Your Victim: Efficiency and Collusion with CompetitorBased Formula Pricing Clauses, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 599, 628 n.167 (1989) (“[A]rtificial
standardization may indicate an attempt to form cartels.”).
195. 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630
F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015).
196. Id. at 433. Such conspiracies violate antitrust law because they injure
consumers directly and help conceal price fixing. See Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, supra
note 55, at 410–13.
197. Plaintiffs’ Proposed Findings of Fact, In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust
Litig., No. 04 CV 5723, 2013 WL 1174714, at *168–69 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013) (“Before
the current and settled Defendants coordinated their efforts, the marketplace featured
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consumers.198 Although the banks had met repeatedly to exchange and
discuss their respective arbitration clauses and their clauses became
uniform after this series of meetings, the district court rejected
artificial standardization as a plus factor by stating that “[t]o infer an
illegal agreement from artificial standardization, the uniformity in
products cannot be the result of legitimate processes.”199 This standard
is troubling because it suggests that the plaintiffs must show that the
artificial standardization is the product of an illegitimate conspiracy,200
which implies that the plaintiffs must first prove an illegal conspiracy
before the artificial standardization is treated as a plus factor.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s verdict for the
defendants and, in doing so, further compounded the problem of
when artificial standardization constitutes a plus factor. The appellate
opinion phrased the plus-factor inquiry as “whether the arbitration
clauses were ‘artificially standardized’ as a result of an illegal agreement.”201
Under this articulation, the court seemed to require proof of an illegal
agreement as a prerequisite to artificial standardization being a plus
factor. The Second Circuit framed the inquiry incorrectly: the issue is
not whether the plaintiffs can prove that the artificial standardization
is the product of an illegal conspiracy. Rather, the issue is whether the
artificial standardization supports an inference of an underlying illegal
conspiracy among the banks to impose mandatory arbitration (with
class action waivers) on the defendant banks’ customers.
In essence, the Ross opinions improperly reordered the inferential
relationship between artificial standardization and proof of an illegal
agreement. Artificial standardization is circumstantial evidence that
supports an inference of illegal collusion. The Ross opinions, however,
suggest that artificial standardization is not a plus factor unless the
plaintiffs can prove that the artificial standardization was done
major participants with neither arbitration clauses nor class action waivers, and another
with an arbitration clause without a class action waiver.”).
198. Leslie, Conspiracy to Arbitrate, supra note 55, at 410–12; Mark A. Lemley &
Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1,
37–39 (2015).
199. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448.
200. The district court improperly phrased the issue as whether the “Banks’
arbitration clauses were artificially standardized as a result of their illegal agreement to
include class action waivers and to otherwise bar collective redress.” Id. (emphasis
added). The standardization is artificial because banks do not need to coordinate their
arbitration clauses the way that cellphone makers need to comply with agreed-upon
technical standards.
201. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
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pursuant to an illegal antitrust conspiracy. This is incorrect because
plaintiffs do not have to first prove an illegal agreement in order for
artificial standardization to be a plus factor. After all, if the plaintiffs
could independently prove an underlying illegal agreement, they
wouldn’t need to raise the issue of artificial standardization as a plus
factor.
9. Stable market shares
Some plus factors can be described as cartel markers, a term that
refers to economic or market phenomena that are often seen in
cartelized markets but are less consistent with competitive markets. For
example, if the firms in a market maintain the same relative market
shares over time, this is a cartel marker, and thus a plus factor.202 Stable
market shares are suspicious because competitive firms jockey for
market share, trying to take sales away from their competitors.203 Cartel
managers, on the other hand, dislike fluctuating market shares, which
make it more difficult to equally distribute the cartel’s profits and to
monitor members for cheating on their cartel agreement.204 Pricefixing conspirators try to prevent market share fluctuations by setting
production limits and fixing each cartel member’s market share.205
This makes cartel cheating less tempting and less likely.206 Given the
relationship between market share stability and cartel stability, federal
courts treat inflexible market shares as an important plus factor.207
202. See cases cited infra note 207.
203. See, e.g., Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1986)
(treating sellers’ refusal to sell products to willing customer as circumstantial evidence
of collusion).
204. See ERVIN HEXNER, INTERNATIONAL CARTELS 76 (1945).
205. See id. (“Cartel agreements frequently contain certain provisions regulating the
quantity and quality of production (supply), the direction of trade (markets), and the
determination of trade terms (prices in the broadest sense).”); id. at 77 (“Many cartel
agreements are based on determined marketing shares of participants.”); see, e.g., Joel
M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, Entry and Predation: The Case of British
Shipping Cartels 1879–1929, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 41, 51 (1999).
206. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 24, at 121–22 (discussing “the role of a market
share allocation in deterring secret deviations”); Christopher R. Leslie, Balancing the
Conspiracy’s Books: Inter-Competitor Sales and Price-Fixing Cartels, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 2,
11–12 (2018).
207. See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 210
(3d Cir. 2017) (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“Market share stability is a well-recognized
symptom of collusive and concerted action in antitrust cases.”); In re Text Messaging
Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 876 (7th Cir. 2015) (“[I]nflexibility of the market
leaders’ market shares over time [] suggest[s] a possible agreement among them not
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Despite the fact that stable market shares are a cartel marker that serve
as a plus factor, some courts have discounted the significance of this
circumstantial evidence unless the plaintiff presents direct evidence of
an agreement to fix prices. For example, a North Carolina district court
in Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc.208 discounted this plus factor because
“the stability of their market shares does not tend to exclude the
possibility that defendants acted independently, particularly in light of
a lack of any direct evidence to the contrary.”209 As support, the court
cited the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in In re Citric Acid, which the Hall
court described as
affirming [a] district court’s grant of summary judgment for one
defendant because although “the evidence in the record . . . clearly
shows that several [defendants] conspired to . . . allocate market
shares,” the plaintiffs had no direct evidence against that defendant
and therefore the evidence did “not support a reasonable inference”
against that defendant.210

This is astonishing because even when a market is corrupted by an
actual conspiracy to allocate market shares, the court reasoned that
stable market shares do not indicate collusion absent direct evidence
of a conspiracy. Other antitrust opinions, too, have diminished the
probative value of stable market shares by suggesting that, in the
absence of direct evidence of collusion, the defendants’ market share
stability may be the product of unilateral action, and therefore
awarding defendants’ summary judgment.211
to alter prices, since such an alteration would tend to cause market shares to change.”);
White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 582 (1st Cir. 2011) (treating “stable market
shares” as plus factor); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651,
659 (7th Cir. 2002) (“In part because of those transactions the market shares of the
defendants changed very little during the period of the alleged conspiracy, which is
just what one would expect of a group of sellers who are all charging the same prices
for a uniform product and trying to keep everyone happy by maintaining the relative
sales positions of the group’s members.”); In re Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc. Cheese
Antitrust Litig., No. 9 CR 3690, 2013 WL 212908, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2013)
(“Unusual and sustained pricing stability is not expected in a competitive market and,
as a ‘plus factor,’ can indicate collusion.”).
208. 296 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D.N.C. 2003), aff’d sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
118 F. App’x 680 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
209. Id. at 676 (emphasis added).
210. Id. at 676 (quoting In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1106 (9th Cir. 1999))
(emphasis added).
211. Valspar, 873 F.3d at 210 (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“Just like the District Court,
the majority weighed the expert evidence on this issue and made a finding: that the
evidence of (likely unilateral) market share stability was insufficient in this case to show
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Such analysis misconstrues the plus-factor framework for proving an
illegal price-fixing agreement through circumstantial evidence. If a
plaintiff had the type of direct evidence that these courts demanded,
then the plaintiff would not need to invoke plus factors at all, stable
market shares or otherwise. By demanding direct evidence of collusion
before crediting stable market shares as a plus factor, these opinions
fundamentally undermine the ability of plaintiffs to plead and prove a
circumstantial case for price fixing.
10. Summary
For each of these plus factors, courts have committed the same error.
Federal judges across several circuits have taken well-established plus
factors and deprived them of their probative value because the plaintiffs
did not proffer direct evidence of illegal collusion. Part III explains how
these antitrust opinions have fundamentally misconstrued the process of
proving an agreement through circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately,
many courts have employed additional tactics to undermine the
significance of circumstantial evidence in price-fixing litigation, as the
following two Sections explain.
B. Causation
Beyond explicitly requiring direct evidence of an agreement before
crediting plus factors, courts have also diminished the probative value
of circumstantial evidence by improperly introducing a causation
component into plus-factor analysis. For example, the inter-competitor
sharing of price information is a plus factor because conspirators use
this information to set the cartel price and to monitor for cheating.212
Despite its importance as circumstantial evidence in price-fixing
litigation, some antitrust opinions have seemingly woven a directevidence requirement into this plus factor by bringing causation into
the inquiry. In In re Baby Food, for example, the Third Circuit held that
in order for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment, “there must be
evidence that the exchanges of information had an impact on pricing
decisions.”213 In its subsequent opinions, the Third Circuit interpreted
In re Baby Food as holding it is not enough to show “that the exchanges

concerted action or agreement. It seems to me that if the court is ‘weighing evidence’
or ‘making findings’ it should be at trial, on a full record and done by a fact finder, i.e.,
a jury or judge sitting without a jury.”).
212. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text.
213. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 125 (3d Cir. 1999).
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of information ‘impacted the market as a whole.’”214 Instead, the Third
Circuit required antitrust plaintiffs to link “information exchanges
with specific collusive behavior.”215 Under this approach, the price
exchange alone is no longer circumstantial evidence; rather, the
plaintiffs must prove that the price exchange caused the defendants to
raise their prices. In essence, the court is manifesting a version of the
mistake documented in Part II.A: the court is demanding plaintiffs
establish that the defendants colluded in order for the plaintiffs to get
credit for a plus factor that is designed to help prove collusion. This
confuses the relationship between plus factors and proof of conspiracy.
If the plaintiff had proof of the “specific collusive behavior” demanded
by the court, that alone would be sufficient to prove a Section 1
violation.216 Plus factors would be unnecessary at that point.
Similarly, in Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan,217
the Eighth Circuit imposed a quasi-causation requirement on another
version of the price-exchange plus factor. The court asserted that price
verifications on past sales are not probative of collusion when “[t]here
is no evidence to support the inference that the verifications had an
impact on price increases.”218 Price verifications—in which competitors
confirm actual prices charged to actual consumers in prior transactions—
are a plus factor because they are a monitoring device used by cartel
members to ensure that their co-conspirators are not cheating by
charging a price below the cartel-fixed price.219 In the Eighth Circuit’s
formulation, however, the plus factor of price verification is not a plus
factor at all unless the plaintiffs can separately prove that the plus
factor itself causes the price to increase. This approach might make sense
if the plaintiffs were challenging the defendants’ price verifications as an

214. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350, 369 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing and
quoting In re Baby Food); see also In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 163 F. Supp. 3d
175, 238 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“A jury could consider the manufacturers’ communications to
be probative of an agreement only if there is some evidence that exchanges of
information had an impact on pricing decisions.”) (citing In re Flat Glass and In re Baby
Food).
215. In re Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 369.
216. Id.
217. 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
218. Id. at 1034.
219. Penne v. Greater Minneapolis Area Bd. of Realtors, 604 F.2d 1143, 1147–48
(8th Cir. 1979).
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independent antitrust violation, but they were not.220 The defendants’
price-verification system was merely a plus factor, one among many
that the plaintiffs proffered;221 plus factors do not have to have a causal
nexus to antitrust injury. The defendants’ practice of verifying prices
with each other served as circumstantial evidence of an underlying
agreement among the defendants to fix prices.
Courts have also invoked these causation concepts to reject foreign
price-fixing activities as a plus factor. Notably, in In re Chocolate, the
Third Circuit asserted that proof of the defendants’ participation in
the Canadian chocolate cartel was not evidence of price fixing in the
American market unless the plaintiffs could “show that the unlawful
Canadian conduct actuated, facilitated, or informed the U.S. conduct.”222
The court’s language comes close to requiring direct evidence. After
all, if antitrust plaintiffs must prove that foreign price-fixing activity
essentially actuated illegal parallel pricing in the United States, then
the plaintiffs must essentially present direct evidence of collusion as to
the U.S. market in order for the defendants’ foreign price fixing to
count as a plus factor.
These examples of judicial coupling of plus factors and causation
are problematic. As a matter of law, causation is a separate element
from agreement. In order to prove illegal price fixing, a private antitrust
plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) agreement or concerted
action; (2) an unreasonable restraint of trade (which horizontal price
fixing is, by definition); (3) an effect on interstate commerce; and (4)
causal antitrust injury.223 Causation is its own discrete element. Yet, in

220. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1047–48 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (noting that
plaintiffs were using “price verifications as circumstantial evidence of a broader
conspiracy”).
221. In addition to the defendants’ price verifications, the plaintiffs also proffered
evidence the potash market was susceptible to cartelization because of its high barriers
to entry, inelastic demand, and a standardized product, each of which is a separate
plus factor; that one defendant had solicited a price-fixing agreement; that the
defendants had issued advance price announcements and exchanged price lists; that
the defendants had “an explicitly discussed cheater punishment program;” and that
the defendants charged similar prices despite different production costs. Id. at 1044,
1051 (Gibson, J., dissenting).
222. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 405 (3d Cir. 2015)
(emphasis omitted).
223. See McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 1988) (“To
establish a section 1 violation under the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate
three elements: (1) an agreement, conspiracy, or combination among two or more
persons or distinct business entities; (2) which is intended to harm
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the above opinions, courts suggested that a single piece of circumstantial
evidence intended to help prove the first element of a price-fixing claim
must independently prove the fourth element. This is misguided.
Plus factors are not part of the causation inquiry. They are
circumstantial evidence that help prove the first element of a pricefixing claim: agreement. Thus, in In re Baby Food, the issue was not
whether the individual plus factor of inter-competitor price exchanges
caused antitrust injury; it was whether all of the plus factors proffered
by the plaintiff—when viewed holistically—showed an agreement to fix
price. The causation inquiry comes after the plaintiff demonstrates that
an agreement has occurred. Similarly, in Blomkest, the plaintiffs were
not arguing that the inter-competitor price verifications were
themselves causing parallel prices. Rather, they were explaining how
these price verifications were part of a cartel enforcement mechanism,
which—when combined with the other plus factors224—indicated that
the defendants’ parallel price increases were the product of collusion.
Finally, the plaintiffs in In re Chocolate who proffered evidence of the
defendants’ foreign price-fixing activities were not arguing that this
foreign collusion was actuating or causing domestic collusion. Instead,
they were proffering evidence of an important plus factor, which
demonstrated a strong motive to fix prices in the American market, as
well as illustrating these defendants’ experience in solving the
coordination and trust problems that can doom price-fixing conspiracies.
None of the plus factors in these cases—inter-competitor price
exchanges, price verifications, or foreign price fixing—play a role in
proving the causation element of a price-fixing claim.
In sum, the Third and Eighth Circuits have conflated plus factors
and causation, which is improper because antitrust law does not
require plaintiffs to prove that the particular behavior that constitutes
any individual plus factor causes anticompetitive harms. As the Tenth
Circuit has explained, plaintiffs do not have to demonstrate that “an
instrument used to effectuate” a price-fixing conspiracy actually “caused
supra-competitive prices.”225 Instead, the tools of cartel management
and enforcement—whether they be price verifications or price

or unreasonably restrain competition; and (3) which actually causes injury to
competition, beyond the impact on the claimant, within a field of commerce in which
the claimant is engaged (i.e., ‘antitrust injury’).”).
224. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1047–48 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (noting that
plaintiffs were using price verifications to evidence a broader conspiracy).
225. In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1265–66 (10th Cir. 2014).
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announcements or other cartel devices—are circumstantial evidence
of the underlying conspiracy.226 If courts require that a plus factor have
a demonstrable effect on price, they are essentially requiring the plaintiff
to present direct evidence of a price-fixing agreement. At a minimum, the
opinions of the Third and Eighth Circuits are undermining the
significance of important circumstantial evidence.
C. The Backwards-Reasoning Fallacy
Courts have also distorted the relationship between circumstantial
and direct evidence in price-fixing cases by reprimanding plaintiffs for
even proffering plus factors to make a circumstantial case. Most
notably, in Blomkest, the Eighth Circuit’s en banc majority condemned
the plaintiffs’ use of price verifications as a plus factor because “the
class’s argument regarding price verifications . . . assumes a conspiracy
first, and then sets out to ‘prove’ it.”227 The court held that “a litigant
may not proceed by first assuming a conspiracy and then explaining
the evidence accordingly.”228 Applying this logic to the price
verifications themselves, the majority opined that if the plaintiffs “were
to present independent evidence tending to exclude an inference that
the producers acted independently, then, and only then, could it use
these communications for whatever additional evidence of conspiracy
they may provide.”229 The Eighth Circuit’s opinion mischaracterizes
the proffering of plus factors as inviting backwards reasoning and
incorrectly requires plaintiffs to prove collusion before its plus factors
would be credited.
Under the Blomkest logic, in order to survive summary judgment,
antitrust plaintiffs must first prove the existence of an illegal conspiracy
and then present plus factors. This makes no sense; it’s backwards and
imposes an impossible burden on plaintiffs trying to prove a conspiracy
through circumstantial evidence. By misapprehending the function of
circumstantial evidence, the opinion effectively requires plaintiffs to
present direct evidence of collusion before making a circumstantial
case that the defendants conspired to restrain trade.230

226. Id.
227. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc., 203 F.3d at 1033.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1037 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 1039 (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“The Court today rejects circumstantial
evidence of conspiracy and requires direct evidence to withstand summary judgment
in an antitrust case.”).
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Moreover, the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning is completely at odds with
the Supreme Court’s antitrust jurisprudence that describes the hoops
that plaintiffs must jump through in order to get their price-fixing
claims before a jury. The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly231 established a new heightened pleading requirement, which
encourages plaintiffs to plead as many plus factors as possible to survive
a motion to dismiss. Courts have interpreted Twombly as holding that
“[t]o plead a conspiracy through circumstantial evidentiary facts, a
plaintiff must allege both (i) actual parallel conduct and (ii) additional
‘plus factors’ to ‘nudge[ ] the[ ] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible[.]’”232 Prior to Twombly, federal courts held
that “a plaintiff need not allege the existence of these plus factors in
order to plead an antitrust cause of action.”233 Post-Twombly, however,
absent direct evidence, a plaintiff’s failure to plead plus factors could
result in the dismissal of its price-fixing claims.234
The Eighth Circuit’s approach is also inconsistent with the Supreme
Court’s summary judgment jurisprudence. In Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,235 the Supreme Court held that “[t]o
survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a
plaintiff seeking damages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence
‘that tends to exclude the possibility’ that the alleged conspirators
acted independently.”236 Many courts interpret Matsushita to require
231. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
232. Kelsey K. v. NFL Enters., LLC, 757 F. App’x 524, 526 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
233. Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 230 (3d Cir. 2004).
234. White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 577 (1st Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs must
establish that it is plausible that defendants are engaged in more than mere conscious
parallelism, by pleading . . . evidence pointing toward conspiracy, sometimes referred
to as ‘plus factors.’”); Abbott Labs. v. Adelphia Supply USA, No. 15-CV-5826 (CBA)
(LB), 2017 WL 5992355, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2017) (“To plead a horizontal pricefixing conspiracy through circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must allege parallel
conduct and plus factors.”); Oxbow Carbon & Minerals LLC v. Union Pac. R.R., 926 F.
Supp. 2d 36, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2013) (same); In re Pool Prods. Distribution Mkt. Antitrust
Litig., 988 F. Supp. 2d 696, 711 (E.D. La. 2013) (same); Avenarius v. Eaton Corp., 898
F. Supp. 2d 729, 737 (D. Del. 2012) (same); Superior Offshore Int’l, Inc. v. Bristow
Grp. Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 505, 511–12 (D. Del. 2010) (same). But see In re Loestrin 24
Fe Antitrust Litig., 814 F.3d 538, 549 (1st Cir. 2016) (“[T]his court has cautioned
against converting Twombly’s mandates into a requirement that antitrust plaintiffs
provide evidentiary support or set forth other ‘plus factors’ to demonstrate the
plausibility of their Sherman Act claims.”).
235. 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
236. Id. at 588.
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plaintiffs to proffer evidence to support as many plus factors as possible
in order to survive the price-fixing defendants’ inevitable motion for
summary judgment.237 Indeed, Blomkest itself held that “[a] plaintiff has the
burden to present evidence of consciously paralleled pricing supplemented
with one or more plus factors.”238 This is what the plaintiff did and the court
accused it of backwards reasoning for proffering plus factors that
somehow assumed collusion. The Blomkest majority admonished the
plaintiffs for doing exactly what the court instructed them to do: show
parallel pricing supplemented with plus factors. Ultimately, the court
simultaneously requires plus factors and disregards them unless the
plaintiff has already proven a conspiracy.
By accusing antitrust plaintiffs of engaging in backwards reasoning,
Blomkest turns the plus-factor framework on its head. If antitrust
plaintiffs do not plead plus factors, their price-fixing complaint is
dismissed under Twombly as not plausible. If they do not proffer
evidence of plus factors, courts may cite Matsushita to grant summary
judgment to the defendants. Yet under the Blomkest formulation,
plaintiffs are to be chastised for presenting plus factors to support their
price-fixing claims because, according the Blomkest majority, these plus
factors “assume[] a conspiracy first, and then set[] out to prove it.”239
In so holding, the Eighth Circuit effectively forecloses the use of
circumstantial evidence to prove anticompetitive collusion.
Although the Blomkest court’s analysis is unsound, it has proven
influential. The Third Circuit in Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours
& Co.,240 for instance, applied the Eighth Circuit’s backwardsreasoning argument to reject competitors’ sharing of sales data as a

237. Todorov v. DCH Healthcare Auth., 921 F.2d 1438, 1456 n.30 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“To ensure that we do not punish unilateral conduct, however, we require more than
mere evidence of parallel conduct by competitors to support an inference of a
conspiracy; an agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when
‘plus factors’ exist.”); see also In re Managed Care Litig., 430 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1345
(S.D. Fla. 2006) (“Thus, a plaintiff relying on evidence of parallel conduct to show a
conspiracy where the competing inference of independent action is just as likely
must present additional evidence of conspiratorial behavior to survive summary
judgment.”), aff’d sub nom. Shane v. Humana, Inc., 228 F. App’x 927 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam).
238. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1033 (8th Cir.
2000) (en banc).
239. Id. at 1033.
240. 873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017).
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plus factor.241 To support their claim that the defendants’ thirty-one
parallel price increases for titanium dioxide were the product of
manufacturers conspiring to raise prices, the antitrust plaintiffs
proffered several plus factors, including the fact that the defendants
had shared production, inventory, and sales data with each other
through the Global Statistics Program (GSP).242 Despite the fact that
sharing such data is an important plus factor related to cartel
monitoring, the Third Circuit quoted Blomkest to argue that the
plaintiff’s “argument suffers from the loaded question fallacy. Instead
of setting out to prove: ‘Does the GSP show that a conspiracy existed?,’
[plaintiff] attempts to answer: ‘How did the GSP further the
conspiracy?’ This approach cannot satisfy [plaintiff’s] burden.”243
These questions, however, are not as distinct as the Third Circuit seems
to think. Many plus factors answer both of the Third Circuit’s questions
simultaneously, demonstrating that a conspiracy existed by showing
how the conspiracy operated. The Valspar court’s confusion upends the
plus-factor framework. If the plaintiff bringing a price-fixing claim
cannot “satisfy [its] burden” by presenting recognized plus factors,
then antitrust plaintiffs cannot rely on circumstantial evidence; the
only avenue left is direct evidence.244
Other antitrust opinions have quoted Blomkest and chastised plaintiffs
for “first assuming a conspiracy” and have rejected numerous plus
factors, including inter-firm communications and opportunities to
conspire,245 parallel pricing and price signaling,246 and awareness of
241. See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text (explaining that the intercompetitor exchanges of sales data is a plus factor).
242. Valspar, 873 F.3d at 198.
243. Id. In rejecting price signaling as probative of price fixing, the district court in
Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 152 F. Supp. 3d 234 (D. Del. 2016),
aff’d, 873 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2017) embraced the Blomkest opinion’s condemnation of
price-fixing plaintiffs who “proceed by first assuming a conspiracy and then setting out
to prove it.” Id. at 249. The Valspar district court reasoned that price signals “would
perhaps describe how a conspiracy practically functioned, but only if there were there
some indication of an agreement to begin with.” Id.
244. Valspar, 873 F.3d at 212 (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision could easily
be read to require direct evidence of an agreement in an oligopoly/antitrust case
despite the fact that neither our prior jurisprudence (nor the Supreme Court’s) has
ever required such evidence.”).
245. In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 156 F. Supp. 2d 1017, 1043
(C.D. Ill. 2001), rev’d, 295 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002).
246. Valspar, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 249; Holiday Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Philip Morris,
Inc., 231 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1277 (N.D. Ga. 2002), aff’d sub nom. Williamson Oil Co. v.
Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003).
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rivals’ price increases.247 At least one court has invoked Blomkest’s
language to reject expert testimony.248 Finally, some judges considering
price-fixing claims have used the Blomkest anti-assumption admonition
to reject the plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence writ large.249
All of these judicial decisions betray a misunderstanding of how
circumstantial evidence works. In all areas of law, plaintiffs relying on
circumstantial evidence have a theory of the case and a clean slate
upon which to place their circumstantial evidence, which in pricefixing litigation is denominated as “plus factors.” Antitrust plaintiffs
proffer as many plus factors as they can in order to demonstrate that
their theory of the case is plausible and should be decided by a jury. If
courts reject plaintiffs’ circumstantial evidence because the plaintiffs
started with a theory of their case and then laid out circumstantial
evidence consistent with that theory, then courts have essentially
eliminated circumstantial evidence as a means of proving illegal
collusion.
III. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PLUS FACTORS AND AGREEMENT
The cases analyzed in Part II show courts depleting the probative
value of plus factors unless the plaintiffs can separately prove the
presence of the underlying illegal agreement. This is a Catch-22: a plus
factor is not evidence of an as-yet unproven agreement unless the
plaintiff can independently prove that agreement. Yet if the plaintiff
can independently show the agreement, then she doesn’t need the
plus factor in the first place. When courts require plaintiffs to prove an
agreement before circumstantial evidence can be a plus factor, they
impose a logically impossible burden on plaintiffs in making a
circumstantial case, which is the vast majority of plaintiffs bringing
price-fixing claims.
The traditional two-step framework for using circumstantial evidence
to prove an agreement among competitors is essentially a syllogism.
First, the plaintiff must show conscious parallelism, which alone

247. In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig. (II), No. 11-658, 2012 WL 5383346, at *4 (W.D.
Pa. Nov. 1, 2012) (“Plaintiff points to Defendants’ communications with customers,
and isolated instances of purported predictions of co-Defendants’ price increases.”).
248. Allen v. Dairy Mktg. Servs., LLC, No. 5:09-CV-230, 2013 WL 6909953, at *12
(D. Vt. Dec. 31, 2013).
249. Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., No. 03-3290-CV-S-RED, 2008 WL 11384211,
at *10 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2008), aff’d, 565 F.3d 417 (8th Cir. 2009); In re Nw. Airlines
Corp. Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 174, 196 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
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provides an insufficient basis for inferring an agreement.250 Second,
the plaintiff must present plus factors that indicate that the parallel
conduct (that has already been established) is the product of an
agreement and not independent decision making by the competing
firms.251 This syllogism can be expressed as a simple formula:
CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM + PLUS FACTORS = AGREEMENT
Despite the fact that courts uniformly describe this as an appropriate
framework for proving a price-fixing agreement through circumstantial
evidence, the decisions discussed in this Article have changed the order
of proof, such that:
CONSCIOUS PARALLELISM + AGREEMENT = PLUS FACTORS
This reconverted syllogism makes no sense because proof of
agreement is not a way of proving plus factors; rather, plus factors are
a way of proving an agreement through circumstantial evidence. Yet,
this convoluted reordering of the syllogism is apparent across several
different plus factors, in which dozens of courts have made the same
mistake of misconstruing the relationship between plus factors and
agreements. By way of review:
●
Courts have suggested that competitors having the opportunity
to conspire is not a plus factor unless the plaintiff first presents direct
evidence that an illegal conspiracy occurred during that opportunity;252
●
Several courts have interpreted the inter-competitor communications
plus factor in a manner that essentially necessitates direct evidence of an
agreement in order for this plus factor to count as circumstantial evidence;253
●
Courts have held that even inter-competitor price exchanges are
not probative of collusion unless the plaintiff can first prove that the
communications themselves constitute an illegal agreement;254
●
Courts have suggested that possessing competitors’ pricing
materials and other confidential documents is not necessarily evidence
of a conspiracy unless the plaintiff can show how the documents were
250. See supra notes 54–62 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 63–71 and accompanying text.
252. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., No. 94 C 897,
1999 WL 33889, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 19), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 186 F.3d 781 (7th
Cir. 1999).
253. See supra notes 99–129 and accompanying text.
254. In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 126 (3d Cir. 1999).
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transferred pursuant to a conspiracy, which requires plaintiffs to first
prove a conspiracy before courts will credit the plus factor;255
●
Courts have diminished the significance of foreign price fixing
as a plus factor by requiring plaintiffs to present direct evidence of the
foreign price fixing and its direct connection to the alleged domestic
price fixing;256
●
Courts have implied that artificial standardization is not a plus
factor unless the plaintiff can prove that the artificial standardization
was the “result of an illegal agreement,”257 which would require the
plaintiff to prove an illegal agreement first and then show that the plus
factor followed;
●
Courts have asserted that stable market shares were not a plus
factor unless the plaintiff had “direct evidence” of an agreement;258
●
Finally, in Alakayak, the Alaska Supreme Court essentially
declared that an invitation to collude was not a plus factor unless the
plaintiff could show an agreement.259
Indeed, the Alakayak court not only treated agreements as a
prerequisite for crediting plus factors, it demoted proof of an agreement
to a mere plus factor. The Alaska Supreme Court asserted that
“evidence of a traditional conspiracy agreement” is not a plus factor
“unless there is evidence of both an invitation to collude, as well as
acceptance of that invitation.”260 In applying its rule, the court noted
that the plaintiff proffered “documents . . . tending to establish the
invitation” and that “[a]cceptance can reasonably be inferred from the
evidence that [one alleged co-conspirator] set a low initial price in
1991 before other defendant processors, from the evidence that [one
defendant’s] representatives ‘agreed’ with [another defendant’s]
suggestion of a $0.50 initial price in a February 1991 meeting,” and
from other evidence.261 The court concluded that this evidence of an
offer to collude coupled with evidence of acceptance “constitutes a

255. See supra notes 159–67 and accompanying text.
256. In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 405 (3d Cir. 2015);
Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003); see supra
notes 178–91 and 221–22 and accompanying text.
257. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis added).
258. Hall v. United Air Lines, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 2d 652, 676 (E.D.N.C. 2003), aff’d
sub nom. Hall v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 118 F. App’x 680 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
259. Alakayak v. British Columbia Packers, Ltd., 48 P.3d 432, 458 (Alaska 2002).
260. Id.
261. Id. (citations omitted).
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‘plus factor.’”262 The Alakayak court’s approach confuses the
relationship between proof and plus factors. The plaintiff’s evidence
of offer and acceptance is not simply a plus factor; it is the entire
anticompetitive agreement. To demote proof of an agreement to mere
plus-factor status exposes a fundamental misunderstanding of how
plus-factor analysis works.
All the antitrust opinions discussed in this Section have, in different
ways, improperly required the plaintiff to prove an agreement (sometimes
explicitly requiring direct evidence) in order to have a plus factor given
credit as circumstantial evidence. This approach effectively dismantles
the entire plus-factor framework and, in some cases, effectively
requires antitrust plaintiffs to present direct evidence. Because direct
evidence of price fixing is rarely available, this fundamental mistake in
the application of plus-factor analysis risks undermining price-fixing
law entirely.
CONCLUSION
Direct evidence of cartel agreements is rarely available because
cartel managers and participants go to great lengths to conceal their
price-fixing activities. Indeed, concealment efforts are themselves a
plus factor for determining whether an illegal agreement exists.263 The
absence of direct evidence—despite the presence of illegal price
fixing—is precisely why the Supreme Court and federal courts
developed the plus-factor framework and have employed it for over
seventy years, allowing plaintiffs to prove antitrust conspiracies
through circumstantial evidence.264 Yet recent opinions have
undermined this body of law.
The travesty here is not merely that courts are requiring antitrust
plaintiffs to present direct evidence of an agreement. Though that
alone is a serious mistake, the problem is far worse. Courts are
requiring antitrust plaintiffs to have direct evidence of an agreement
in order to survive summary judgment. Under this approach, courts
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Kan.
2012) (recognizing the defendants’ efforts to conceal their communications as a plus
factor).
264. Gen. Chems., Inc. v. Exxon Chem. Co., 625 F.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Cir. 1980)
(“Even a successful antitrust plaintiff will seldom be able to offer a direct evidence of
a conspiracy and such evidence is not a requirement.”); Alakayak, 48 P.3d at 450 (“A
plaintiff is not required to present any direct evidence, but may support his case solely
with circumstantial evidence.”).
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essentially preclude plaintiffs from presenting to a jury antitrust
conspiracy claims that are based on circumstantial evidence. Courts
that require direct evidence for an antitrust plaintiff to survive
summary judgment are essentially ignoring the standard for summary
judgment—or turning it on its head. The standard is not whether the
plaintiff must win given the evidence that it has presented. The
standard is whether a reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff.
One plus factor at a time, federal courts are making it unreasonably
difficult for antitrust plaintiffs to bring price-fixing cases based on
circumstantial evidence. Judicial opinions, such as those examined in
Part II, that deprive circumstantial evidence of its probative value serve
to embolden conspirators and strengthen price-fixing cartels. Courts
must do a better job of recognizing that when they are employing the
plus-factor framework, they should not ask the plaintiff to present
direct evidence of an agreement.
Courts sometimes appear overly eager to dismiss price-fixing
complaints or grant summary judgment to defendants on antitrust
collusion claims even when plaintiffs have pleaded numerous plus
factors from which an agreement to restrain trade could reasonably be
inferred. By misinterpreting the process of identifying and applying
plus factors, courts create a significant risk of false negatives: firms that
have actually engaged in illegal price fixing may escape liability
because courts have made it inappropriately difficult for plaintiffs to
prove agreements through circumstantial evidence.
Although courts repeatedly tout the well-established rule that
anticompetitive agreements can be established through either direct or
circumstantial evidence,265 by misapplying the dismissal and summary
judgment standards in price-fixing cases relying on circumstantial
evidence, some courts have made it practically impossible to prove price
fixing through circumstantial evidence.266 This undermines the entire

265. Toledo Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 530 F.3d 204, 219 (3d
Cir. 2008) (citing Rossi v. Standard Roofing, Inc., 156 F.3d 452, 465 (3d Cir. 1998))
(“[W]hile direct evidence, the proverbial ‘smoking-gun,’ is generally the most compelling
means by which a plaintiff can make out his or her claim, it is also frequently difficult for
antitrust plaintiffs to come by. Thus, plaintiffs have been permitted to rely solely on
circumstantial evidence (and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom) to
prove a conspiracy.”).
266. Valspar Corp. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 873 F.3d 185, 206 (3d Cir.
2017) (Stengel, J., dissenting) (“The majority’s formulation of the summary judgment
standard in this case, coupled with its dismissive treatment of unprecedented parallel-
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antitrust regime. As Judge Gilbert Merritt has explained, as it becomes
“possible to do away with price fixing cases based on reasonable
inferences from strong circumstantial evidence . . . the antitrust laws
fall further into desuetude as the legal system and the market place are
manipulated to benefit economic power, cartels, and oligopolies
capable of setting prices.”267 Diminishing the role and the probative
value of circumstantial evidence undermines deterrence of price
fixing, which harms consumers by raising prices of—and reducing
access to—food, healthcare, and the necessities, as well as the luxuries,
of life.268 Ultimately, converting plus-factor analysis into a direct-proof
requirement protects price-fixing conspirators from antitrust
liability.269

conduct evidence, creates too high a hurdle for plaintiffs attempting to prove a pricefixing conspiracy using circumstantial evidence.”).
267. In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig., 583 F.3d 896, 915–16 (6th Cir.
2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting).
268. See Kaplow, supra note 66, at 518 (“[D]isallowance of circumstantial evidence
would presumably reduce deterrence because liability could no longer be successfully
established in certain settings.”); Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest
Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 885, 885 (2012).
269. See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1039 (8th
Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“Because conspirators cannot be relied
upon either to confess or to preserve signed agreements memorializing their
conspiracies, the court’s requirement for direct evidence will substantially eliminate
antitrust conspiracy as a ground for recovery in our circuit.”); PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION ¶1410b, at 71–72 (3rd ed. 2010) (“Because insistence upon direct proof
would remove too many conspiracies from the embrace of the antitrust laws, the courts
necessarily consider circumstantial proof of agreement.”).

